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THE "BIG" ANTITRUST CASE:
25 YEARS OF SISYPHEAN LABOR*
James R. Withrowt and Richard P. Larmtt
INTRODUCTION
A. Background to the Current Situation
The problem of efficiently and fairly managing large civil
litigations in the federal courts, particularly large antitrust cases,
has been extensively examined over the past twenty-five years. Ap-
parently stimulated by several unusually complex and protracted
governmental civil antitrust actions in the late 1940's,1 pioneering
studies were undertaken between 1949 and 1954 which form the
basis for much of the current wisdom on how to expedite pro-
tracted litigation. 2 These early writings emphasized the efficient
* This Article is intended to be an up-date of the pioneer study, The Big Case: Procedural
Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REv. 27 (1950), written 25 years ago by Mr.
Withrow's partner Breck P. McAllister, who died this past summer.
Note: Throughout this Article, citations to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will
appear in the shortened form "Rule 28," "Rule 16," etc.
t Member, New York and D.C. bars. Partner, Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine, New
York, New York. A.B. 1932, LL.B. 1935 Cornell University. Author of numerous articles
in the field of Antitrust Law; Chairman of the Antitrust Law Section of the New York
State Bar Association 1972-73. Member of the panel in the New York University seminar
proceedings on handling the "Big Case," published in 21 F.R.D. 427 (1957).
tt Member, New York Bar. A.B. 1967, J.D. 1970 Harvard University. Associated with
Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine 1970-75. Attorney with the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice 1975-76.
The views expressed herein are strictly those of the two authors and do not in any way
represent those of the Justice Department.
1 See Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62-64 (1952).
2 ABA SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE IN THE TRIAL OF ANTITRUST CASES (1954) [hereinafter cited as MCALLISTER
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pretrial organization of single large suits, primarily governmental
actions for equitable antitrust relief.
In the main, the early studies proposed that large cases be
quickly assigned to a single judge,3 that the judge immediately
assume "iron-hearted" control over the scope and structure of pre-
trial proceedings, 4 that discovery and presentation of proofs be
limited to clearly material areas, 5 that an early and on-going effort
be made to particularize and narrow disputed issues,6 and that trial
proofs be identified and scheduled in advance.7 The early studies
usually assumed that trial would be before the pretrial judge and
without jury.
Between 1954 and 1964, much scholarly activity was directed
at consolidating and refining the studies of the early fifties. The
Judicial Conference of the United States Courts held seminars on
"protracted cases" and related matters at New York University in
1957,8 at Stanford University in 1958,9 and in Boulder, Colorado,
in 1960.11 In 1958 the ABA published a study on complex litiga-
tion entitled Streamlining the Big Case, t" and in 1960 the Judicial
Conference issued its Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the
REPORT]; SYMPOSiUim, BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (CCH
1951); McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L.
REV. 27 (1950) [hereinafter cited as The Big Case]; Yankwich, supra note 1.
Other early studies of protracted litigation include the following: THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT, pt. VIII, at
343-93 (1955); Connelly, untitled remarks, in The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery, 12
F.R.D. 131, 140-45 (1951); McAllister, The Judicial Conference Report on the "Big Case": Pro-
cedural Problems of Protracted Litigation, 38 A.B.A.J. 289 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Pro-
cedural Problems]; Marsh, Pretrial Discovery in an Anti-Trust Case, 8 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
401 (1953); Noonan, The Trial of an Anti-Trust Case, 8 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 392 (1953);
Prettyman, Recommendationsfromn the Courts, 2 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 27 (1953); Yankivich,
Observations on Antitrust Procedures, 10 F.R.D. 165 (1951); Gesell, Book Review, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 1085 (1952). For a very comprehensive study on the general application of pretrial
procedures, see H. NINIS, PRE-TRIAL (1950).
The Big Case, supra note 2, at 52.
Gesell, supra note 2, at 1087; Prettyman, supra note 2, at 27; Yankwich, supra note 1,
at 65-66.
MCALLISTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 23, 26-27; Connelly, supra note 2, at 145;
Hand, Trial Efficiency, in BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note
2, at 31-33A; The Big Case, supra note 2, at 56-57.
6 MCALLISTER REPORT, SUpra note 2, at 18-21; The Big Case, supra note 2, at 53-56;
Prettyman, supra note 2, at 29;, Yankwich, supra note 1, at 66-68.
McALLISTER REPORT, supra note 2, at 32-35, 39; The Big Case, supra note 2, at 55.
B Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1957).
Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319 (1958).
I" Proceedings of the Seminar on Practice and Procedure under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 37 (1960).
11 13 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 183 (1958).
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Trial of Protracted Cases.'2 The basic recommendations of the earlier
studies were generally accepted in these later studies, which sought
to articulate precise methods to accomplish certain goals-e.g.,
"particularization" of issues, "control" of discovery, and shortening
of trial proofs.
These studies recognized the importance of timing each pre-
trial step for -maximum advantage, but they remained flexible, if
not downright uncertain, as to what was the best possible schedule.
Considerable attention was given to the possibility of early trim-
ming away of "fringe" issues and undisputed matters, and of using
special masters to expedite discovery and direct the organization of
complex and technical proofs. One critic remarked that the cre-
ation of elegant pretrial procedures was becoming a goal in itself,
to the detriment of effective issue-refinement by judge and coun-
sel. 13 The debate over whether formal procedures are preferable
to informal ones (with both sides citing splendid examples of their
favorite techniques) has not died, as will be seen below.
Judicial and professional thinking about the management of
large antitrust litigations took a second quantum leap forward in
the early 1960's, with the advent of the myriad "electrical equip-
menC cases.' 4 The rapid onslaught of so many treble-damage ac-
tions strikingly demonstrated that necessity mothers invention.
Using untried and voluntary procedures, the Judicial Conference
faced the new problem of multiparty/multidistrict litigation by
organizing national programs of discovery and issue determina-
tion, and by encouraging the consolidation and transfer of separate
actions into a relatively few forums. t 5 There has been both praise
and criticism of the energetic, perhaps ruthless manner in which
the Conference's Coordinating Committee limited the timing and
scope of national discovery, and one writer has gone so far as to
assert that the electrical equipment cases were settled in spite of the
12 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Handbook].
'3 McDowell, Pretrial Procedures: Pretrial v. Procedure, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 675 (1959).
See also Bromley, Judicial Control of Antitrust Cases, 23 F.R.D. 417 (1958); Wright, The Pre-
trial Conference, 28 F.R.D. 141 (1960).
14 The electrical equipment cases have been written about so often in law reviews that
a description is unnecessary. Of interest, are two books which deal with them. C. WALTON
& F. CLEVELAND, CORPORATIONS ON TRIAL: THE ELECTRIC CASES (1964), and J. FULLER,
THE GENTLEMEN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE PRICE-FIXERS IN THE ELECTRICAL IN-
DUSTRY (1962). Suffice it to say that commencing in 1961, between 1,900 and 2,000 sepa-
rate treble-damage actions were filed in some 35 different districts.
" See Panel Discussion: The Impact of the Electrical Antitrust Cases upon Federal Civil
Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 495 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion].
1976]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
coordinated procedures instituted therein.'"
The experience of the electrical equipment cases led directly to
the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1407, allowing transfer for coordinated
pretrial proceedings, and to the creation of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation to administer the new law. 17 Furthermore,
aspects of the electrical equipment experience found their way into
the Judicial Panel's 1969, 1970, and 1973 Manuals for large cases.' 8
In particular, the emphasis of the Manuals on carefully observed
timetables and successive "waves" of discovery apparently derives
from that experience.' 9 The alternative procedure for coordinat-
ing complex cases without a section 1407 transfer, as outlined in
the current Manual, also seems to be drawn from the methods
devised in the early sixties.20
With the arrival of truly complex multiparty/multidistrict liti-
gation in the mid-sixties, along with the advent of massive class
actions in the late sixties, judicial emphasis has shifted from
"merely" managing single party issues of antitrust liability and in-
junctive relief to managing diverse and sometimes competing is-
sues which affect many parties-e.g., liability, fact of damages, and
quantum of damages. The definition of complexity has itself be-
come more complex.
B. The Current Situation
After some twenty-five years' study, it might seem that "man-
ageability" has been achieved in complex antitrust cases. A com-
prehensive Manual exists to guide the complete course of pretrial
and trial endeavor. The United States courts have available the
research resources of the Federal Judicial Center.21 Use of single-
16 Sawyer, untitled remarks, in Panel Discussion at 506. For other views on the discovery
and pretrial proceedings in the electrical equipment cases, see Bane, Pretrial Discovery in
Multiple Litigation from the Plaintiffs' Viewpoint, 32 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 117 (1966); Kohn,
untitled remarks, in Panel Discussion at 499; McAllister, Judicial Administration of Multiple-
District Treble Damage Litigation, in N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST LAW SYMPosIuM 55
(1966); O'Donnell, Pretrial Discovery in Multiple Litigation from the Defendants' Standpoint, 32
ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (1966).
l"See H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968); McDermott, The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 57 F.R.D. 215 (1973); Note, The Judicial Panel and the Con-
duct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1001 (1974).
18 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRIcT LITIGATION
(CCH 1969, 1970) and MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (CCH 1973) [hereinafter cited
as 1969 MANUAL, 1970 MANUAL, etc.].
1 See 1970 MANUAL § 1.5; 1973 MANUAL § 1.50.
2" See 1973 MANUAL §§ 5.02-5.40.
21 See id. at xi.
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judge assignments 22 and pretrial procedures23 has become the
norm. Nonetheless, the matter of "manageability" continues to be
studied, 24 both in an effort to further refine or reform well-
established pretrial and trial devices, and in an effort to control the
course of complex treble-damage suits. The proliferation of mul-
tiple-plaintiff suits has added a new "horizontal" dimension to ju-
dicial management of large cases. This new dimension has helped
to confound the older, "vertical"--i.e., chronological-aspect of ju-
dicial management. Questions of transfer, class determination,
"waves" of discovery, scheduling of successive trials, and the like
now compete for attention with motions to dismiss, motions for
summary judgment, motions for leave to amend, and judicial ef-
forts to particularize the issues through entry of detailed pretrial
orders. Furthermore, new cases may be brought while older ones
are being readied for trial and while still others are being set-
tled-with court supervision in the case of class actions. Control of
large litigations has, more than ever, become a matter of timing
and early determination by the judge of his own pretrial objectives.
C. Current Needs
In the text that follows, we maintain that the crux of truly fair
and efficient management of large cases is still "iron-hearted" con-
trol by the judge.25 Despite, or perhaps in part because of the
plethora of recommended and required pretrial techniques, it is by
no means clear that such control is always exercised. Second, we
believe that large antitrust litigations would be better controlled
and certainly more fairly adjudicated if it were frankly recognized
that pretrial, not trial, is where the merits of such cases are re-
vealed. Trial, if it occurs at all, is but the final denouement of
pretrial adjudication, 26 save in the case where pretrial respon-
sibilities have been neglected by the presiding judge.
22 See id. § 5.01.
23 See Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 451 (1970).
24 See, e.g., ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Investigation and Evidence in Antitrust Cases:
New Developments, 41 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 519 (1972); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Prep-
aration and Trial of an Antitrust Treble Damage Suit, 38 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1968); ABA
Section of Antitrust Law, Symposium on Antitrust Class Actions, 41 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 229
(1972); Pollack, supra note 23; Pollack, Pretrial More Effectively Handled, 65 F.R.D. 475
(1974); Note, supra note 17.
25 See also Withrow, A Defense Counsel's View of a Government Civil Antitrust Case, 21
F.R.D. 427 (1957).
26 See Kaufman,Judicial Control over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 125 (1960).
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I
MOST CASES ARE NOT TRIED
That the trial of antitrust actions is rather a rare event is at-
tested to by current figures from the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. In fiscal year 1973, sixty civil antitrust actions
brought by the United States terminated, but only seven, i.e., only
11.7 percent, reached trial.27 In fiscal year 1974, fifty-four such
actions terminated, with only six, or 11.1 percent, actually reaching
trial. 28 As for private antitrust actions, 981 terminated during fiscal
year 1973, with only ninety-two of them, or 9.4 percent, reaching
trial. 29 In fiscal year 1974, 1,473 private antitrust actions termi-
nated, with but ninety-eight cases, or 6.7 percent, reaching trial."
It has come to be recognized that termination prior to trial is the
rule in the antitrust area,31 as in many other areas of litigation.32
Breaking down the above statistics, the Administrative Office
records show that around forty percent of these pretrial termi-
nations have been by settlement. 33 A slightly larger proportion,
roughly fifty percent, have been by court action, with the majority
of these occurring "before pretrial" as opposed to "during or after
pretrial. '34 No clear definition is given as to what is covered by the
rubrics "before" and "during or after" pretrial. In any event, ter-
mination before trial is vastly more common than termination by
way of trial.
2 7 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS: ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
Table C-4, at 358-59 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1973, 1974, etc.].
28 ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1974, Table C-4, at 415.
29 ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1973, Table C-4, at 358-59.
" ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1974, Table C-4, at 416.
3' See, e.g., Collen, Procedural Directions in Antitrust Treble Damage Litigation: An Overvieu'
of Changing Judicial Attitudes, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 997 (1972); Furth & Burns, The Anatomy
of a Seventy Million Dollar Sherman Act Settlement-A Law Professor's Tape Talk with Plaintiff's
Trial Counsel, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 865, 880 (1974); Handler, The Shift from Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits---the Twenty-third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1971).
11 See ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1973, Table C-4, at 358-59; ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1974, Table
C-4, at 415-17.
11 ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1974, Table C-4, at 416.
34 Id.
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II
THE IMPORTANCE OF PRETRIAL ADJUDICATION
Although most antitrust claims are resolved prior to trial, such
resolutions can take a long time. Again turning to statistics pro-
vided by the Administrative Office, one sees that during fiscal year
1973 the median duration of private actions terminated by the
court "before pretrial" was eleven months, with ten percent of
these actions dragging on for over forty-five months.35 Where such
terminations occurred "during or after pretrial," the median dura-
tion of the cases was twenty-seven months, with ten percent lasting
over sixty-four months.36 During the following year, the median
duration of private actions terminated by the court "before pre-
trial" increased to eighteen months, with ten percent of these cases
consuming sixty months or more.37 Where such terminations oc-
curred "during or after pretrial," the median duration of the cases
declined slightly to twenty-four months, with ten percent lasting
beyond fifty-four months.3 8 In view of these statistics, it is clear
that a great deal of work goes into the pretrial adjudication of
complex cases.
Moreover, pretrial termination is a decision on the merits, not
only because it effectively represents all of the justice that the par-
ties will receive, but because settlements or other pretrial termina-
tions are largely determined by the merits of the various claims and
defenses. Assuming that the burden of being sued or bringing suit
does not alone coerce a settlement, any resolution prior to trial will
represent the parties' composite assessment of how they stand on
questions of liability and damages.3 9 Likewise, even preliminary
35 ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1973, Table C-5a, at 368-69.
36/d.
37 ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1974, Table C-5a, at 428-3 1.
38 Id. By way of comparison, the median duration of private cases terminated by trial
was 28 months in fiscal year 1973 (10% lasting over 62 months) and 30 months in fiscal
year 1974 (10% lasting over 64 months). ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1973, Table C-5a, at 368-69;
ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1974, Table C-5a, at 428-31. In general, termination by trial does not
appear to have been significantly slower than termination during or after pretrial proceed-
ings.39 See 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 16.17 (2d ed. 1974); Collen, supra note 31, at
998; National Institute on the Corporate Trustbusters, Workshop IV: Handling the Big Case,
43 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 215, 241-42 (1973). See also Brennan, The Continuing Education of
theJudiciary in Improved Procedures, 28 F.R.D. 42, 49 (1960) (a splendid example):
When each side can see through pretrial discovery the whole case exposed to
view before the day of decision, each is in the best possible position to evaluate his
chances of success, or lack of them. But what they have learned should be con-
1976]
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judicial determinations-e.g., rulings coordinating "front-burner"
and "back-burner" cases as to discovery and preparatory efforts,
rulings on class action matters, and rulings on the initial scope of
discovery-reflect the judge's view of the parties' substantive posi-
tions, if not the precise weight to be accorded to each."
Remarks made during Judicial Conference proceedings with
specific reference to Rule 16 procedures also emphasized the im-
portance of pretrial adjudication:
The administration of justice does not mean merely dispensing
justice, merely having a judge referee a fight between two
lawyers. The administration of justice means administration; a
judge has to get into these cases and administer them. The
lawyers are likely, in their advocacy, to run off in different direc-
tions; it's the judge who brings them back to the issues; it's the
judge who shows them where the point of the case is, where the
issues are.41
The adjudication of a case in the federal courts should be seen as
a process continuing from the date of filing to the date of final
decree. The "courtroom scene" often alluded to is only the last
act in an often extended drama.42
While pretrial proceedings do not always result in the court's
finding answers as to where the merits lie, they should at least
refine the relevant questions so the parties themselves or the trier
of facts can more easily divine the answers. Pretrial proceedings
without such a goal are likely to be diffuse and wasted.43 Ulti-
mately, the goals of pretrial (and trial) proceedings are efficiency
of disposition and accuracy of result. Although antitrust cases ac-
count for only a very small percentage of federal cases filed,44
densed before trial if both sides are to have the maximum results from its use.
And it is at the pretrial conference that the case is synthesized in a tailor-made
document suited only for the particular cause to which it relates.
40 Although district courts are not supposed to pass upon the merits in ruling on pre-
liminary issues such as whether to certify a class action (Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
("Eisen I1"), 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)), many district
courts appear to construe that stricture narrowly.
41 Wright, supra note 13, at 141.
42 Kaufman, supra note 26, at 125.
4' See Freund, The Pleading and Pre-trial of an Antitrust Claim, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 555, 562
(1961); Gourley, Effective Pretrial Must be the Beginning of Trial, 28 F.R.D. 165, 170 (1960);
The Big Case, supra note 2, at 29-30; McDowell, supra note 13, at 679-82; Pollack, supra note
23, at 451; Wright, supra note 13, at 150.
14 In fiscal year 1974, some 1.2% of all federal civil actions were antitrust cases-the
[Vol. 62:1
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increased dispatch in their adjudication is of value to the entire
federal court system45 and to litigants as well.46 Accuracy of result
is likewise important as a basic component of justice: it is the sub-
stance behind the form of pretrial and trial procedures and a goal
which must be reconciled with the need for efficiency.47
III
DEVICES FOR PRETRIAL MANAGEMENT
A number of procedures can be used to effectively adjudicate
large antitrust actions during the pretrial period. Much of the re-
mainder of this Article will examine the more prominent of these
procedures to see whether they allow: (1) early and effective con-
trol by the pretrial court, (2) determination of the merits of the
litigation (i.e., the true issues and their support), (3) efficiency and
speed, and (4) accurate findings of material facts.
same figure as in fiscal year 1973. ADMIN. OFFICE REP. 1974, supra note 27, at 207; ADMIN.
OFFICE REP. 1973, at 127.
45 In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 348-49 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that liberalized use of collateral estoppel
would be justified in patent-infringement cases even if few suits were thus disposed of,
since such liberalization would, in the Court's view, still eliminate several complex and
lengthy actions. See also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 190-94
(1973).46 A good example of inefficient judicial administration leading to what might be
called an indefinite delay in adjudication is the case of Waldron v. British Petroleum Co.,
38 F.R.D. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd sub nom. Waldron v. Cities Service Co., 361 F.2d
671 (2d Cir. 1966), affd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968),
a case in which one of the authors participated. This action, alleging group boycott and
conspiracy by major oil companies in the early 1950's, was brought in 1956. By 1968, all
that had been accomplished was summary judgment for one defendant. See 391 U.S. 269-
70. For an analysis of that summary judgment, see 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 196 (1968).
By 1968, there had already been two substitutions of plaintiff due to the deaths of earlier
claimants. As of 1971, certain other summary judgment motions were being considered,
and plaintiff still had not been allowed to commence general discovery. See First Nat'l
Bank v. British Petroleum Co., 324 F. Supp. 1348, 1361-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (appendix to
opinion outlines 15 years' worth of pretrial proceedings). The lack of truly "ironhearted"
control by the early pretrial judges helped turn this particular litigation into a marathon
that literally outlived its value to the original claimant and .embroiled the defendants for
years on end.
4 See The Big Case, supra note 2, at 29; Prettyman, The Spirit of the Rules, 28 F.R.D. 51,
57-60 (1960). As Prettyman explained:
Accuracy is not an easy goal. It requires patience, persistence, intelligence, energy,
self-control. And these are virtues difficult to attain.
However all that may be, the Rules accentuate accuracy as the goal to be
sought. The whole purport of the Rules is to that effect. Pretrial and discovery are
two outstanding features to that end.
Id. at 60.
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A. Multidistrict Transfers
One device of signal importance to antitrust litigation is the
multidistrict transfer of actions deemed to share common issues of
fact and law. The initial determination whether actions share
common issues and deserve joint pretrying is made by the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the body created to apply the
pretrial transfer statute.48 The Panel's decisions are to be based on
consideration of each transfer petition in its entirety, with regard
for every significant factual nuance.4 9 To a considerable extent, the
most important factor appears to be the potential for saving ju-
dicial effort, and not the immediate convenience to parties or
witnesses. 50 In any event, the Panel's primary responsibility is only
to effect the transfer of supposedly complex and related actions; it
is the transferee court which must coordinate those actions through
plans which do justice to all.5 1
The simultaneous pretrying of numerous separate actions by a
single judge may lead to conflicts among the parties as to the tim-
ing and scope of discovery, and the scheduling of trials. These are
precisely the kinds of problems that led to creation of the pretrial
transfer process under section 1407;52 their resolution, however, is
no simple matter.
As for conflicts between early and late filing plaintiffs, an ac-
cepted solution has been to let the latecomers share in earlier gen-
eral discovery and to defer their individual demands.5 3 This seems
fair enough, since latecomers cannot expect to disrupt on-going
proceedings which in many instances they might well have joined
before. If a defendant wishes to pursue discovery against latecom-
ers, however, that should be unobjectionable so long as he does not
delay elsewhere. 54 Under some circumstances, the late-filed claim
should be adjudicated in tandem with similar, earlier ones, even
48 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970). See H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 17, at 3; McDermott,
supra note 17, at 220.
4
°See McDermott, supra note 17, at 220. For a ready listing and summary of all Panel
decisions, see 13 MODERN FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST, Courts 277.2.
50 See McDermott, supra note 17, at 220.
51 See 1973 MANUAL, supra note 18, at § 1.10; Note, supra note 17, at 1033.
52 See H.R. REP. No. 1130, supra note 17, at 2.
'3 See 1973 MANUAL § 3.11 (regarding use of prior discovery).
54 In the antibiotics proceedings (see notes 201-07 and accompanying text infra), in
which the authors have been involved as defense counsel, the court allowed defendants to
conduct some discovery against a number of late-filing foreign government plaintiffs even
while defendants prepared for and commenced trial with certain domestic consumer and
competitor plaintiffs.
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where the earlier discovery does not entirely fit the new claim. A
converse problem may arise where a new claim dresses itself in the
pleadings and discovery requests of other actions in order to
achieve an early joint adjudication which it does not truly de-
serve. 55 This sort of "piggy-backing" can only be prevented by in-
tense judicial analysis that digs behind the pleadings of each new
claim.
As for conflicts regarding the timing and subject matter of
discovery, important issues common to all or most of the actions
have generally taken precedence. In the electrical equipment cases,
this meant national discovery (i.e., coordinated discovery in the
different cases which were located from coast-to-coast) by plaintiffs
on issues of defendants' liability (existence of conspiracy, etc.) and
national discovery by defendants with regard to transactions in
certain primary product lines.56 Some defense attorneys in the
electrical equipment cases have expressed the view that they were
unduly hamstrung by the rigid schedules and narrow bounds re-
garding their discovery. 57 However, the intention of the national
discovery program was to delay local discovery until closer to trial.
To the extent that many cases were not actually settled before
trial,58 this is apparently what happened.
In a more recent litigation, involving the gypsum wallboard
industry, it appears that these conflicts were decided at least in part
by the dates on which the 141 separate actions were filed.59 The
earliest cases, the so-called "dealer group," were prepared for trial
and actually tried while proceedings in the other groups (contrac-
tors, subcontractors, owner-builders, and governmental entities)
were stayed. Eventually, pretrial proceedings commenced in the
"back-burner group," with not only discovery being made available
from the earlier proceedings, but also collateral estoppel effect as
Referring again to the antibiotics cases (see note 54 supra and notes 201-07 and
accompanying text infra), the confusion of similar and dissimilar plaintiffs' claims was com-
pounded, in the defendants' view, by the diverse motions for leave to amend which were
argued and allowed early in 1974. Defendants argued at that time that domestic insurance
company and union welfare fund plaintiffs had no reason to raise allegations of exclu-
sionary and anticompetitive conduct in foreign markets, which allegations had first been
made by a competitor plaintiff having substantial business in those foreign markets.
5' See articles cited in note 14 supra.
'7 See articles by McAllister, O'Donnell, and Sawyer cited in note 16 supra.
5S8 See Panel Discussion, supra note 15, at 511.
59 The findings and conclusions of the first gypsum trial are reported in Wall Prods.
Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 & 357 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Cal. 1971 &
1973); a summary of all proceedings is reported in In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959
(N.D. Cal. 1974).
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to the previous determination of liability against two defendants.
The subsequent discovery focused upon the other four defendants'
possible liability and issues of damages, and it was apparently pur-
sued simultaneously along different tracks.
An important aspect of planning coordinated discovery is
keeping a balance, not just among different cases, but between
plaintiffs and defendants. Defendants' discovery must often center
around local questions of knowledge and impact-matters that are
usually far more diffuse than questions of liability. 60 Where the
plaintiff is a large entity, it is likely that defendants will obtain
adequate individual discovery; but where the plaintiff is a class of
small claimants, the only discovery readily available is the general,
theoretical, class-as-a-whole discovery that defendants have almost
always found unsatisfactory in aiding their factual preparation and
in affording them due process.61 Despite the ruling in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin ("Eisen III")62 against "fluid class recovery," it is
still too early to determine the extent, if any, to which defendants
will be allowed direct discovery against absent class members.
The final type of conflict in coordinated proceedings-in-
volving the question of which cases are to be prepared and tried
first, and which later-is perhaps the most fundamental. To ask
this question is to assume that the various cases cannot be tried
simultaneously but separately in their original forums, but such an
assumption is often justified. So far, fewer than ten percent of the
cases transferred under section 1407 have been sent back to their
original forums. 63 This low percentage of remands is undoubtedly
due to a feeling by transferee courts that remand of their work to
judges unfamiliar with it is wasteful and unfair. 64 In any event,
scheduling of trial preparation deadlines is essential even if the
cases are eventually remanded, since such scheduling is the only
way in which overlap and conflict in pretrial discovery and motions
can be avoided.65
60 See O'Donnell, supra note 16, at 142.
61 See Note, Requests for Information in Class Actions, 83 YALE L.J. 602, 613-14 (1974).
62 479 F.2d 1005, 1016-18 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See note 74
infra.63 See Note, supra note 17, at 1017.
4 See id. See also In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299, 307 (S.D.N.Y.),
mandamus denied sub nom. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971). Among promi-
nent recent antitrust cases that have been remanded and tried in their original forums are
North Carolina v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 384 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.C. 1974), and Telex Corp.
v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla.), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
" See 1973 MANUAL, supra note 18, at appendix §§ 2.31-3.00.
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Furthermore, the order of pretrial proceedings, which is
largely based on the intended order of trial, may effectively deter-
mine which actions are the "test cases" for the others. This factor
was explicitly acknowledged and used by Judge Zirpoli in the gyp-
sum litigation. 6 There, the test cases were chosen because they
were the first filed, a relatively accidental factor, and because they
involved direct purchases from defendants, a substantive factor. l 7
It should be obvious that the first trial will to some degree impose
the character of its plaintiff upon decisions of supposedly general
applicability. If "offensive estoppel" is to be allowed, the pretrial
court owes it to all parties to decide well in advance which group of
cases can best and most fairly determine generally applicable is-
sues, as well as which group can most quickly adjudicate the largest
number of major issues.6 The process should not be haphazard.
In sum, it appears that coordinated proceedings in multi-
party/multidistrict antitrust actions generally allow, if not demand,
the approaches enumerated at the beginning of this section. Such
proceedings permit early and effective control by pretrial courts.
They compel an awareness of exactly what the parties must prove
and how they intend to do so, and such proceedings greatly en-
hance the prospects for overall efficiency and speed. Coordinated
proceedings work best if the pretrial court is accurately abreast of
the material facts, the real contentions, and the true interests of the
parties.6 9 These values are the raison d'etre of coordinated pretrial
proceedings, and coordination without them is mere confusion.
B. Class Action Management
The class action device has had a dramatic impact upon the
pace and scope of antitrust litigation. In fiscal year 1973 some 157
new antitrust actions alleged class status, and in fiscal year 1974 the
number of such filings was 114 .7 There has been considerable
66 In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959, 963-64 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
67 Id. at 963.
68 For strong arguments against nonmutual application of collateral estoppel, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), see the dissenting opinions in the en banc
decision of Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 766-67, 770-71 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). However, a recent decision which appears to minimize the
distinction between offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel is In re Yarn Process-
ing Patent Validity Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 74 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
69 The coordinated pretrial procedures made possible by 28 U.S.C. § 1407 are, accord-
ing to one eminent antitrust scholar, a rather signal success. Handler, supra note 31, at 15.
70 ADMIN. OrrICE REP. 1974, supra note 27, Table 63, at 259. The Administrative Of-
fice did not report class action figures before 1972, and hence a more historical view (per-
centage of increase since 1966, for example) cannot be attempted.
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debate whether class actions are necessary to aid small claimants
and to constrain corporate miscreants,7 1 or whether they amount
to "legalized blackmail, ' 7 2 strike suits on a gigantic scale, and a
"Frankenstein Monster" threatening the judicial system.7 3 Recently
some answers have been emerging. The celebrated Eisen litigation
has led to a Second Circuit decision condemning the concept of
"fluid class recovery"7 4 and to a Supreme Court decision that class
representatives, regardless of their poverty or their claim's merit,
must pay for nothing less than the best practicable class notice.7 5
Despite the failure of the Supreme Court's Eisen decision to
adequately define "manageability," and despite continued ferment
on this issue, it seems clear that unwieldy antitrust class suits are
being reduced in size or eliminated altogether.76 This is being ac-
complished through determinations regarding "common questions
of law or fact," the "superiority" of the class method, the existence
of sufficient "numerosity," the adequacy of the intended represen-
tative party, and general "manageability." Each of these methods
will be briefly discussed in turn.
First, a number of antitrust plaintiff classes have recently been
71 See, e.g., Dole, The Settlement of Class Actions for Damages, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 971,
1006 (1971); Kohn & Kaplan, The Antitrust Class Suit: A Manageable Instrument for Social
Justice, 41 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 292, 300 (1972); Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusive-
ness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299 (1973).
72 Handler, supra note 31, at 9.
11 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin ("Eisen I"), 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (dissent-
ing opinion, Lumbard, C.J.). See also Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plain-
tiff's Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365, 365-68 (1972); Malina, The Search for the Pot of Gold, 41
ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 301, 320 (1972); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruc-
tion, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1972).
11 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin ("Eisen II"), 479 F.2d 1005, 1017-18 (2d Cir. 1973),
vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
There is some dispute as to whether the Supreme Court actually reversed that portion
of the Second Circuit ruling dealing with "fluid class recovery" or whether, as is more
likely, that crucial issue was ignored in the concern over notification and certification pro-
cedures. See 417 U.S. at 177-79. For a view that the Supreme Court did not support the
Second Circuit on "fluid class recovery," see Eisen IV: Don't Believe the Headlines, 1974 BNA
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 679, at B-1 (Sept. 10, 1974).
7 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
7 It is possible, of course, that some extra judicial time is being consumed in the
adjudication of individual actions that are brought because of the sparing use of Rule 23
devices. See, e.g., In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 385 F. Supp. 1253
(J.P.M.L. 1974), discussed in 1974 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 693, at A-13
(Dec. 17, 1974). The Panel, in that ruling, transferred to the Southern District of Florida
some nine class actions concerning alleged price-fixing on Datsun automobiles. The trans-
fer may be seen as obliquely overruling an earlier decision of the transferee judge that
only certain local classes would be allowed in the Datsun proceedings then before him. See
P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
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refused certification in whole or in part because of the court's
determination that "questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class" did not "predominate over any questions affect-
ing only individual members," and hence the requirements of Rule
23(b)(3) were not met.7 7 Actions by ultimate purchasers have been
held impermissible on the ground that individual questions as
to "passed-on" damages predominated over common issues of
liability.78 Several actions by disgruntled franchisees have been dis-
allowed on the ground that individual issues-e.g., whether coer-
cion amounted to a "tie-in"-predominated over common issues
regarding the behavior and intention of the franchisor. 79 Class ac-
tions by alleged competitors have also been rejected on the ground
7 7 E.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974); Kline v. Coldwell,
Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); In re Transit
Co. Tire Antitrust Litigation, 1975 CCH TRADE CAS. 1 60,144 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Al Barnett
& Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974); DiCostanzo v. Hertz
Corp., 63 F.R.D. 150 (D. Mass. 1974); Gneiting v. Taggares, 62 F.R.D. 405 (D. Idaho
1973); Gulf Wandes Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 62 F.R.D. 377 (E.D. La. 1974); Kinzler v.
New York Stock Exch., 62 F.R.D. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Smith v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc.,
62 F.R.D. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Thompson v. T.F.I. Companies, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 140 (N.D.
Ill. 1974); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1973); National Auto
Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Ralston v. Volks-
wagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Shaw v. Mobile Oil Corp., 60 F.R.D.
566 (D.N.H. 1973); Yanai v. Frito Lay, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 349 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
" E.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974) (individual users of hotel
telephone services); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (indi-
vidual purchasers of automobiles).
79 For examples of actions where class status was denied, see DiCostanzo v. Hertz
Corp., 63 F.R.D. 150 (D. Mass. 1974); Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D.
331 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Smith v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Thompson v. T.F.I. Companies, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 140 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Yanai v. Frito Lay, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 349 (N.D. Ohio
1973).
Perhaps the most important of the cases denying class status is Ungar v. Dunkin'
Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976), reversing 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa.
1975). In the Dunkin' Donuts case, the district court allowed a class suit to proceed on
franchise "tie-in" issues because, upon the most painstaking analysis, it decided that a show-
ing of individual coercion would not be necessary to prove an illegal tie-in, if proof of a
company policy of coercion were made. Therefore, in the district court's analysis, common
issues did predominate on the tie-in claims. The Third Circuit reversed and, in an opinion
explicitly rejecting the view of the court below, held that where no reliance was placed on
express contractual tie-ins, each plaintiff franchisee would individually have to prove coer-
cion.
Franchise cases where class status has been wholly or partially allowed include: Aamco
Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 67 F.R.D. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (standardized con-
tracts required each franchisee to purchase certain equipment from franchisor); Hawkins
v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 1975 CCH. TRADE CAS. 60,153 (W.D. Tenn. 1975) (involvement of
trademark obviated need for individual coercion proofs); Herrmann v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 65 F.R.D. 585 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (each class member raised at least one of 18 primary
issues).
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that individual questions of market definition, intention, and de-
fendant's allegedly abusive conduct predominated over common
issues. "" Of course, classes are still being certified in the antitrust
area, but it appears that only classes of direct purchasers alleging
price-fixing or classes of franchisees suing on provably standard-
ized franchise agreements stand a ready chance of success.,'
Second, there have been recent cases finding the class device
to lack "superiority" on rather interesting grounds. 82 It has been
held, for example, that forming classes of distributors of a defen-
dant manufacturers' products was not a superior device where po-
tential class members possessed strong reasons for wanting to con-
trol and expedite their own cases.83 In another suit by a purported
class of individual Datsun automobile purchasers, only a local class
was allowed because of the excessive cost of notice to a larger
geographical class 4-- a result presaging the remarks of Mr. Justice
Douglas in the Supreme Court's Eisen decision. 85
The recent Ninth Circuit decision in Kline v. Coldwell, Banker &
Co.86 is also of interest as a statement on superiority. The court
there had very harsh words for a proposed class of up to 400,000
Los Angeles area homebuyers. Noting that approximately 2,000
realtor defendants were involved, some of them very small
operators, the court decided that the proposed class would be un-
8 E.g., Boston Pneumatics, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand, 65 F.R.D. 61 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Al
Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974); Kinzler v.
New York Stock Exch., 62 F.R.D. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Shaw v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 F.R.D.
566 (D.N.H. 1973); National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
81 E.g., Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (class of telephone an-
swering service subscribers); Professional Adjusting Sys. of America, Inc. v. General Ad-
justment Bureau, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (class of allegedly boycotted indepen-
dent insurance adjusters); P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla.
1973) (class of individual automobile buyers); Albertsons, Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.,
62 F.R.D. 43 (D. Utah 1973), aff'd in pertinent part, 503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974) (limited
class of direct purchasers); City of New York v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 393
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in pertinent part, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974) (class of 200-300 direct
purchasers); Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1973)
(class of credit card holders); Forbes v. Board of Realtors, 61 F.R.D. 416 (D. Minn. 1973)
(class of real estate customers).
82 Rule 23(b)(3), in addition to requiring a predominance of common questions, re-
quires that the class action vehicle be "superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy."
"
3 E.g., J.M. Woodhull, Inc. v. Addressograph Corp., 62 F.R.D. 58 (S.D. Ohio 1974);
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
84 P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
as417 U.S. at 179-86 (opinion dissenting in part).
86 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
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manageable for purposes of proving the liability of individual de-
fendants, that the suit lacked cohesion due to the problem of con-
necting so many individual "conspirators," and that it would be
unfair to impose joint liability for potentially annihilating damages
on the small individual defendants. 87 The concurring opinion of
Judge Duniway was considerably more outspoken in its criticism of
plaintiffs' attorneys and the posture of the litigation. 88
Perhaps most interesting of all is the recent en banc ruling of
the Third Circuit in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,8 9 a "Truth in Lend-
ing Act" case rather than an antitrust one, but very instructive
nonetheless. The majority opinion in Katz held that because of
unusual circumstances presented by the defendant, the district
court should have delayed certification of the plaintiff class until
after trial on the issue of defendant's liability. 90 The unusual cir-
cumstances arose from assertions by the defendant credit card
company that pretrial notice to card-holding potential class mem-
bers would greatly prejudice routine account collection and would
unfairly coerce a settlement. The court of appeals stated that the
district court should have withheld class certification, provided the
defendant had been willing to waive (1) its seventh amendment
right to a unitary jury trial on all issues, (2) its presumptive Rule 23
right to assert resjudicata against non-"opt-out" claimants should it
win at trial, and (3) its use of statute of limitation defenses against
those who would have been included in the class had it been estab-
lished earlier. 91 Under this procedure, the defendant would have
obtained an early trial on liability, and had it lost, a class could
then have been certified to take collateral estoppel advantage of
that defeat.
The dissenters in Katz objected to the majority's unorthodox
approach, pointing to the lack of statutory authorization for delay-
ing certification and the lack of precedential authority for using
"one-way estoppel" to benefit a subsequently formed class.92 Al-
though these objections have some force, the Katz decision consti-
tutes a pragmatic approach to class certification which would not
only prevent undue prejudice to defendants, but might also stimu-
late new thinking on how "test case" devices can be used to facili-
87 Id. at 233-34.
8 8 Id. at 236-39.
89 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
90 Id. at 760-62.
91Id. at 762.
92 Id. at 764-77.
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tate earlier trials in large litigations. If complex class proceedings
can be deferred until basic liability is determined, while maintain-
ing adequate safeguards for those affected, 93 then such deferrals
should be routinely ordered.
Third, courts have employed the rubric of "numerosity" 94 to
defeat class standing in several recent antitrust actions. The prob-
lem here is one of too few potential class members, rather than too
many.95 The potential classes that have been held too small to
merit class treatment were typically those proposed by business
plaintiffs suing their franchisors, suppliers, or competitors. 96 It is
hard to pin down an exact number, but proposed classes with less
than one hundred members would appear to be in trouble, while
classes with at least two or three hundred members will usually be
approved.97 Whatever the number, courts seem concerned to pre-
vent the magnification of individual grievances through the class
device, at least where the self-appointed representative can afford
to go it alone.
Fourth, problems of numerosity have sometimes been inter-
twined with questions of whether the proposed class representative
was typical of his class 98 or adequately able to protect its interests. 99
Most of the recent antitrust cases in which class standing has been
denied on such grounds have, like the numerosity cases, involved
suits among commercial litigants."" Proposed representatives have
93 One such device might be a proviso that if class status is sought, but is judicially
deferred past a trial which the defendant wins, then class status will be denied to subse-
quent plaintiffs. This device might obviate criticism of the Katz approach as one-sided. See
88 HARv. L. REV. 825 (1975).
94 Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be "so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable."
95 The problem of too many class members is dealt with under the "manageability"
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)(D).
96 E.g., Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975);
Thompson v. T.F.I. Companies, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 140 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Al Barnett & Son,
Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974); J.M. Woodhull, Inc. v. Ad-
dressograph Corp., 62 F.R.D. 58 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Bill Minielli Cement Contr., Inc. v.
Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
9'See Herrmann v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 65 F.R.D. 585 (W.D. Pa 1974) (class of
approximately 300 certified); City of New York v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 393
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in pertinent part, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974) (class of approximately
200 certified).
98 Rule 23(a)(3) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be]
typical of the claims or defenses of the class ......
11 Rule 23(a)(4) provides that representative parties must "fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interest of the class."
100 E.g., Boston Pneumatics, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand, 65 F.R.D. 61 (E.D. Pa. 1974). But
see P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973), where the court
held that the plaintiffs, who were individual buyers of Datsun automobiles, could only
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been held to be nontypical because of perceived conflicts among
class members"" or because, despite his representations, the plain-
tiff was simply not similarly situated to those whom he purported
to represent.112 The perception of conflicting interests among po-
tential class members may also mean that no plaintiff will be
deemed qualified to protect the interests of all, and therefore the
action, at least as defined, cannot proceed. Finally, proposed rep-
resentatives have been turned down because of their apparent
complicity in the conduct complained of103 or their involvement in
other shady dealings.1 4 Here again, a plaintiff cannot magnify his
own grievance to class proportions merely by the asking, and the
grounds for denial of class status are entirely pragmatic, both as
written and as applied.
Finally, some courts have denied class status to antitrust claims
in whole or in part because of a perceived lack of general man-
ageability. Other courts have been more optimistic in their expec-
tations of manageability. 11 5 Boshes v. General Motors Corp." 6 repre-
adequately finance and conduct litigation on behalf of local consumers, and therefore the
classes would be reduced to such dimensions.
"I E.g., Thompson v. T.F.I. Companies, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 140 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Al Bar-
nett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974); DiCostanzo v.
Hertz Corp., 63 F.R.D. 150 (D. Mass. 1974).
102E.g., Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 159 (D.N.J. 1974)
(not an antitrust action, but paralleling earlier, already settled antitrust claims); DiCos-
tanzo v. Hertz Corp., 63 F.R.D. 150 (D. Mass. 1974).
"'
3 See Bill Minielli Cement Contr., Inc. v. Richter Concrete Corp., 62 F.R.D. 381 (S.D.
Ohio 1973).
..4 See J.W.T., Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 139 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
'"5 Compare P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973), with
Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973). The former court al-
lowed two local classes of passenger car purchasers to proceed, while the latter found that
even one local class of auto buyers would be unmanageable.
Perhaps reaching a compromise position, several district courts have recently held that
problems regarding the ultimate manageability of uncommon liability issues or of indi-
vidual damage claims should not defeat a class certification intended explicitly or implicitly
for the determination of common liability issues alone. The intent of such decisions is that
separate trials be held, first, on the common issues, and second, on the individual matters.
See In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 70 F.R.D. 23 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d
5 (2d Cir. 1975); Barr v. WUIITAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Herrmann v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 65 F.R.D. 585 (W.D. Pa. 1974). While one must admire the prag-
matic determination of these courts to get on with the determination of basic issues, it
seems that the individual claims and defenses have been treated rather breezily. Nonethe-
less, if the problems inherent in this type of bifurcated procedure are fully and explicitly
dealt with, quite possibly the entire proceedings will be handled more carefully, although
loud and strong objections will undoubtedly continue that bifurcation of the issues favors
the plaintiffs. The court at least has the duty to balance and defuse that advantage while
adjudicating the major common issues.
1.6 59 F.R.D. 589, 601-02 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See also Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co.,
508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (rejected class of 400,000
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sents the former view. In that case the court held that a potential
class of up to forty million passenger car purchasers was simply too
large in view of the notice and transactional proof problems in-
volved. On the other hand, in Forbes v. Board of Realtors' °7 the court
approved a proposed class of some 100,000 real estate purchasers,
concluding that "the complexities of judicial administration pre-
sented by this action are not sufficient to overwhelm the organiza-
tional capacity vested in the Court by . . . Rule 23."10s In at least
two cases, the request for a jury trial (made by defendant in one
instance, by plaintiff in the other) was significant in prompting a
finding of unmanageability) 9
Perhaps epitomizing the problem of manageability is the well-
known litigation In re Hotel Telephone Charges,"" which involved
over six hundred defendants and up to forty million potential class
plaintiffs. The court concluded that the proposed class suit would
literally take decades to try and would really only benefit the attor-
neys involved. It went on to denounce the "fluid class recovery"
concept, stating that the purposes of the Clayton Act are compen-
satory rather than punitive and that neither justice nor antitrust
regulation would be served by the proposed class action."' The
court found nothing in the Supreme Court's Eisen decision to con-
tradict this view.
Like the opinions of Chief Judge Lumbard' 12 and Judge Me-
dina' 1 3 in Eisen, and the decision in Coldwell, Banker & Co., the Hotel
Charges opinion strongly asserts that vast accumulations of small
antitrust claims are inferior in their deserts and impossible in their
procedures as compared to substantial claims by discrete groups of
truly injured parties. Such assertions have probably been neither
vindicated nor undercut by the Supreme Court's Eisen decision.
They go to the very heart of such issues as the purposes of federal
courts, the purposes of antitrust laws, and the need for real defen-
dants to be opposed by real plaintiffs. It is apparent that only
real estate sellers); Marks v. San Francisco Realty Bd., 69 F.R.D. 353 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(rejected class of 13,000 real estate purchasers).
1.7 61 F.R.D. 416 (D. Minn. 1973).
10 8Id. at 418.
109 Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43 (D. Del. 1974)
(defendant requested jury); Gneiting v. Taggares, 62 F.R.D. 405 (D. Idaho 1973) (plaintiff
requested jury).
110 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974).
111 1d. at 91-92.
112 391 F.2d at 570 ("Eisen II," dissenting opinion).
113 479 F.2d at 1005 ("Eisen III," majority opinion).
[Vol. 62:1
1976] THE "BIG" ANTITRUST CASE
Congress can resolve such issues.' 1 4
On the whole, current class action procedures can meet the
criteria for effective pretrial proceedings laid out earlier. But cer-
tification disputes demand early and effective supervision by the
court if they are to be resolved at all. They also demand an aware-
ness of the merits in the sense that real issues and likely methods of
proof must be discerned at an early stage. Moreover, efficiency and
speed are, under Rule 23(b)(3), part of the necessary judicial de-
termination that the class vehicle is superior. Where classes are
refused certification, efficiency is served only to the extent that
numerous separate actions do not commence instead, although the
possibility of chaos can still be minimized through section 1407 and
other coordination devices. Where classes are certified, efficiency
may or may not be served depending upon the accuracy of the
court's certification determination and upon its imaginative use of
subclass, test case, and other devices. 1 5 Ultimately, a concern for
accuracy in factual determinations lies behind the requirements
that "common issues" predominate and that certified classes be
manageable. Certainly truly careful use of Rule 23 procedures can
serve not only to control class issues, but also to focus upon the real
substantive issues.
14 In a study released in June 1974, the Senate Commerce Committee examined the
current role and possible future revisions of class action-type remedies. SENATE Comm. ON
COMMERCE, 92d CONG., 2d SEss., CLASS AcTiON STUDY (Comm. Print 1974), reprinted in
1974 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 670, at G-1 (July 2, 1974). The study
appears to endorse the concept of "fluid recovery" in actions involving large numbers of
small claims. It further suggests that most class actions, save for the very type that merit
"fluid recovery," are proceeding through the courts quite expeditiously indeed and that
"fluid recovery" could significantly expedite otherwise unmanageable actions. Other than
suggesting that an early "mini-hearing" on the merits might be useful in eliminating less
deserving class suits-a device explicitly condemned for now by the Supreme Court's Eisen
decision-the study makes no real effort to address potential problems of managing the
novel type of class suits which it proposes. The study, in particular, fails to consider the
impact upon the courts of a truly large volume of "two dollar" claims, and yet it is just
such a large volume that the study appears to desire.
In a more recent legislative move-the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1976 (enacted just as this Article went to press)--a parens patriae authorization section is
included. Earlier versions of this law included a section concerning the expediting of com-
plex antitrust cases brought by the United States (see S. 1284, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 702
(1975)), but the enacted version does not do so. Once again, a schizoid indifference/con-
cern about judicial management of antitrust claims has been demonstrated. The actual
impact of this new legislation may well be detrimental to judicial management. See notes
232-35 and accompanying text infra.
115 For other discussions of this point, see Note, Managing the Large Class Aition: Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1973), and Note, Litigating the Antitrust Con-
spiracy Under Amended Rule 23: Seigel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. and School District v. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc., 54 U. VA. L. REv. 314 (1968).
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C. Pleading Devices and the Pretrial Conference
It would not be an exaggeration to say that precise "issue def-
inition" was the original reason for pretrial conferences and pro-
ceedings in the federal courts.116 Certainly it was the focus of most
of the early attention upon managing "big cases."'17 Despite the
many other matters that have been engrafted onto the pretrial
stage of complex litigations, delineation of true and false, sup-
ported and unsupported, material and immaterial issues is still the
essence of pretrial work. Appraisal of the issues is vital to all man-
ner of pretrial proceedings, because without it nothing can be fi-
nally adjudicated. The basic tools that the Rules provide for issue
definition include discovery devices (Rules 26-37), pleading devices
(Rules 8, 12, and 15), and the pretrial conference itself (Rule 16).
It is as true now as it was twenty-five years ago that Rule 8
cannot even begin to support careful delineation of the issues.
Special pleading in antitrust cases had some support in the late
1950's,118 but with some trivial exceptions, 119 has not been re-
quired"" and sometimes has not been allowed.' 2 1 Consequently,
issue definition bears only a rather loose relation to the original
pleadings. This state of affairs has been widely recognized and
accepted, perhaps in the optimistic belief that other devices can
carry the burden. 22
The pleading motions provided under Rule 12 are devices to
which litigants often resort, but in the antitrust area such motions
are of particulary limited utility. Motions for more definite state-
ments are largely useless, and motions to strike or to dismiss for
failure to state a claim do not generally fare well.' 23 The prevailing
I1 See 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 16.02 (2d ed. 1974).
1I7 See notes 1-13 and accompanying text supra. See also the decision and protracted
colloquy on issue definition reported in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America,
106 F. Supp. 561, 566-75 (D. Del. 1952).
11 See Dawson, The Place of the Pleading in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the 'Big
Case,' 23 F.R.D. 430 (1958). But see Clark, Comment on Judge Dauson's Paper on the Place of
the Pleading in a Proper Definition of the Issues in the 'Big Case,' 23 F.R.D. 435 (1958); Clark,
Special Pleading in the 'Big Case,' 21 F.R.D. 45 (1957). See generally Freund, supra note 43, at
555-60.
"' E.g., Oak Distrib. Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 370 F. Supp. 889, 895, 898 (E.D.
Mich. 1973).
2"E.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39, 44 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); Brett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1155, 1157-58
(5th Cir. 1972).
121 E.g., Fulton Co. v. Beaird-Poulan, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 604, 609 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
'
22 See 2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 8.02, 12.18[1] (2d ed. 1975); Clark, supra
note 118 (both references).
123 See 2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.21 (2d ed. 1975). See also Battle v. Liberty
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wisdom is that antitrust actions are too complex, too circumstantial
in their nature, and too full of possibly telling factual innuendo to
allow them to fail merely because of deficient pleadings.1 24 Rather
than grant a motion to dismiss, courts routinely give plaintiffs time
to develop factual bases to sustain their claims and defendants time
to develop factual proofs showing the nonexistence of material
factual disputes. In effect, resolution of dubious claims is deferred
until presentation of full-blown summary judgment arguments
under Rule 56.125
Despite the prevailing view that pleadings, particularly anti-
trust pleadings, do not mean very much, a good deal of struggle
can take place over motions pursuant to Rule 15(a) for leave to file
amended pleadings. Notwithstanding the admonition of the Rule
itself that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so
requires,' '112 6 strong agruments sometimes arise over the prejudicial
nature of proposed amendments. The seemingly intense aggrava-
tion of one party at having to "start all over" when another party
makes lengthy "eleventh hour" amendments has sometimes led to
judicial action against such amendments. Where considerable time
has elapsed, much or all of the pretrial work has been accom-
plished, and trial is at hand, amendments that attempt to enlarge
the issues (and hence discovery) have often been denied. 127 Courts
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); Brett v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972); Allied Elec. Supply Co. v.
Motorola, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Pa. 1973). In some cases courts have perceived a
probable failure to state a cognizable claim and, instead of attempting to meet this issue
head on, have moved to nudge the plaintiff out of court by other means. Tlils appears to
have been done, for example, by refusing to certify class standing in cases of extremely
dubious merit. See Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 64 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Tenn. 1974),
aff'd, 518 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1975); Gulf Wandes Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 62 F.R.D.
377 (E.D. La. 1974); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973). One
wonders how much trouble is saved by jumping from one conceptual quagmire to another.
24 See Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1110 (1975); Umdenstock v. American Mtg. & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir.
1974); Brett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972); Material
Handling Indus., Inc. v. Eaton Corp., 391 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Va. 1975); Allied Elec. Sup-
ply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Pa. 1973). But see Vermillion Foam
Prods. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 386 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Oak Distrib. Co. v.
Miller Brewing Co., 370 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
125 It is only when the parties couch their dispute in the form of a truly abstract legal
issue that judgment on the pleadings will succeed. Assertions that the pleadings are "con-
clusory," "vague," "contradictory," or "far-fetched" will usually not prevail against a request
that the court first allow the facts to be developed.
126 See generally 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.08 (2d ed. 1974).
127 E.g., Kirby v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 911 (1974) (amendment delayed three years, therefore denied); Wainwright v.
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have found that amendments prejudice the opposing party's case
where they threaten to delay adjudication, 128 increase expenses, 129
or disrupt existing class notices.1311 Where the court perceives that
the movant could easily have included the proposed amendment in
his original pleadings, a finding of prejudice is even more likely.1 31
The reason for these intense disputes goes beyond the tactical
aggravation of having to defeat the opponent's newest, shiniest
allegation. It is a simple matter of organization and timing-of the
right to finally "go to the mat" on a finite number of issues. To
prepare and then reprepare would, if uncontrolled, become a
Sisyphean labor indeed. The need to settle every conceivable dis-
pute and to have every possible theory and fact presented must be
balanced by the need for a final resolution.
It is at this point that Rule 16 may be invaluable. Although the
purpose of Rule 16 is to assist counsel in making admissions and
agreements that delineate issues and proofs, it also permits judicial
control over uncooperative and unimaginative counsel. The rule
does not merely provide a pretrial referee; it provides, particularly
in conjunction with Rules 12 and 56, for actual pretrying to the
extent that the court can eliminate immaterial or uncontroverted
issues and immaterial or redundant proofs.13 2
Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (amendment to expand period of liability
backwards four years denied); McPhail v. Bangor Punta Corp., 58 F.R.D. 638 (E.D. Wis.
1973) (amendment seeking to expand four-year-old action denied). But see United States v.
IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (amendments to expand six-year-old antitrust
action as to markets and conduct allowed just weeks before trial); Wendkos v. ABC Consol.
Corp., 379 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (amendment changing legal theory as to "tying"
arrangement allowed); Penn Galvanizing Co. v. Lukens Steel Co., 65 F.R.D. 80 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (amendment alleging predatory pricing allowed in light of plaintiff's lack of prior
knowledge); Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Lowey, 373 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(change of patent fraud claim to patent misuse claim allowed in light of public interest); In
re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, Civil No. 71-435 (D. Minn., filed 1971), Misc. Order 74-32
(Feb. 25, 1974) (amendments to expand time period and product line allegations allowed
shortly before trial); Glazer Steel Corp. v. Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 56 F.R.D. 75 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (amendment adding antitrust allegations to two-year-old case allowed).
128 E.g., McPhail v. Bangor Punta Corp., 58 F.R.D. 638 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
129 E.g., Johnson v. Sales Consultants, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 369 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
E.g., Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9 (N.D. Ga. 1973). But see In re
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, Civil No. 71-435 (D. Minn., filed 1971), Misc. Order 74-32
(Feb. 25, 1974).
131 E.g., Kirby v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 489 F.2d 904, 912-13 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 911 (1974). But see Wendkos v. ABC Consol. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 15, 19-20 (E.D.
Pa. 1974) (defendant could not claim genuine suprise).
132 See 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 9 16.02, .04, .11 (2d ed. 1974). See also Life
Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 31 F.R.D. 3, 6-8 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (upheld judicial
power to compel agreement to undisputed facts), discussed in Note, Federal Civil Pro-
cedure-Federal Rule 16-Definition of Issues by the Pre-Trial Judge, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1566
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The methods that a pretrial court can use to narrow disputes
have often been discussed, and many practical suggestions have
been put forward, particularly by federal judges themselves. Sug-
gested measures include the use of pretrial factual statements or
briefs,133 proposed factual findings and counter-findings, 3 4 pro-
posed stipulations, and counter-stipulations, 35 and informal, in
camera, factual discussions by judge and counsel.136 Which devices
are actually used depends, most likely, on the preferences and style
of the judge involved. The Manual makes few concrete recommen-
dations in this area, suggesting only the early disposal of peripheral
issues through Rule 12 and 56 motions, and judicial encourage-
ment of factual stipulations and evidentiary agreements. 3 7 Such
advice has little practical value, although it does at least legitimize
objectives that timid or old-fashioned judges might otherwise be
loath to pursue.
3 8
(1963), and Note, The Role of the Court in Simplifying the Triable Issues at Pre-Trial Conference,
72 YALE L.J. 383 (1962). But see Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961)
(pretrial orders used as "bludgeons" to dispose of cases held improper).
133 See Carter, Judicial Control of the Case and Limitation of Discovery, 23 F.R.D. 406, 407
(1958); Decker, Timing of the First Pre-Trial Conference, Definition of Issues and Control of
Discovery, 23 F.R.D. 592, 595-96 (1958); Handbook, supra note 12, at 387; Holtzoff, Trial of
Protracted Cases, 24 F.R.D. 235, 236 (1959); Resolutions Adopted at [the N.Y.U.] Seminar on
Long Cases, 21 F.R.D. 519, 520 (1957); Resolutions Adopted at the [Stanford] Seminar on Pro-
tracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 614, 615 (1958); Ridge, The Organization of the Big Case-The First
Pre-Trial Conference, 21 F.R.D. 406, 411 (1957); Smith, Defining the Issues and Establishing a
Plan for Trial, 23 F.R.D. 412, 414 (1958).
134 See Pollack, supra note 23, at 463-65.
13 See Murphy, Ground Rules for Documentary Evidence, 23 F.R.D. 445, 449 (1958);
Wright, supra note 13, at 149.
13' See McDowell, supra note 13, at 680-82; Pollack, supra note 23, at 461-62; Procedural
Problems, supra note 2, at 290-91; Yankwich, supra note 1, at 66-68 (arguing that informal
conferences should be followed immediately by pretrial orders summarizing agreements
and positions).
137 See the following sections of the 1973 MANUAL, supra note 18:
§ 1.20-preliminary trial briefs not advised;
§ 1.80- early determination of "special questions" advised;
§ 3.30- final pretrial briefs should limit issues;
§ 3.60-court should promote factual stipulations;
§ 4.20-court should encourage written offers of proof;
§ 4.57-court should limit proofs to material and noncumulative items.
The various editions of the MANUAL have explicitly moved away from the position that was
widely held in the late 1950's and espoused by the Handbook, supra note 12, that early
written statements of the issues (preliminary trial briefs) were advisable. That this move
may be unwise will be discussed later in regard to limitations upon discovery. See note 144
and accompanying text infra. For a careful and not very flattering critique of the 1968
MANUAL, see Note, Observations on the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 68
MicH. L. REv. 303 (1969).
138 In Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), the court
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Insofar as pretrial conferences and resultant pretrial orders
can control the issues in a large antitrust case, they can also prevent
the surprise and prejudicial delay that amended pleadings often
create. To a considerable extent, pretrial orders supplant the
pleadings as the real platform for the parties. Once made, they
need be modified only upon a showing of good cause or good
faith.' 39 Since at the very least their modification is appropriate
only where amended pleadings would be appropriate, 140 Rule 16
gives a court discretionary control equal to and beyond that pro-
vided by Rule 15.
Thus, by early and continued use of pretrial orders a court can
do much to master and then limit disputes between the litigants.
Suffice it to say here that procedures carried out under Rule 16
both permit and demand the following: early and effective control
of the substantive issues by the court, a full appreciation of what
are and are not the salient contentions and proofs, and efficiency
by both court and counsel.
D. Limitations on Discovery
Discovery is vital to any fair and sensible adjudication of anti-
trust cases and is essential to issue definition under Rule 16, but
discovery activities and disputes often protract and undermine pre-
trial procedures. It has been said that the rise of treble-damage
actions, which really only came into their own in the 1950's, was
due in large part to the discovery opportunities provided by the
new Federal Rules of 1938.141 Such a development cannot be
faulted in itself, but the failure of courts handling large antitrust
actions to control the timing and scope of discovery can indeed be
denied not just a motion for summary judgment but also the alternative request that, pur-
suant to Rule 56(d), the court specify those facts raised by the motion which appeared to
be uncontroverted. The court stated that in a complex patent case like the one before it, it
was not obliged to service the parties by helping them frame the issues. Such an abdication
of discretionary responsibility may be proper enough, but it is hardly exemplary.
"I See 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 16.20 (2d ed. 1974). But cf. Wendkos v. ABC
Consol. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 15, 19 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (amended complaint and pretrial or-
ders allowed where justice so required); Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 861-62
(W.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868
(1974) (deviation from pretrial order allowed where no prejudice or real surprise shown).
1I Cf. Matlack, Inc. v. Hupp Corp., 57 F.R.D. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1972). There the court
refused to allow a party to change its theory of liability, even though the theory would
have fallen within the original pleadings. This refusal was justified on the basis of prejudi-
cial delay and, the court said, was within its power under Rule 16 by analogy to Rule 15.
141 Collen, supra note 31, at 1001; Kirkpatrick, Introductory Remarks, 38 ABA ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 4, 5 (1968).
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criticized. Although every early discussion of managing the "big
case" insisted that control and confinement of discovery was es-
sential,1 42 courts have frequently allowed discovery to proceed with
relative abandon, causing delays, raising peripheral issues to the
forefront, and exacerbating relations among the parties. 143
In many cases, the failure to limit discovery is simply a matter
of the court not exercising the powers afforded it, but this failure is
sometimes the result of deliberate policy. In particular, the Manual
explicitly disavows the position taken by the Handbook that discov-
ery should be stayed until initial pretrial efforts to define the issues
have commenced. 1 44
Obviously the question of issue definition versus discovery ac-
tivity is a "chicken and egg" problem, especially if one believes that
initial issue definition must be complete and detailed. Nonetheless,
the first pretrial step in a large litigation should be to organize the
litigation; allowing discovery to commence without a clear concept
of relevance or materiality is to encourage confusion. As has oft
142 E.g., Connelly, supra note 2, at 145; Decker, supra note 133, at 593; Handbook, supra
note 12, at 386-90, 436; Kaufman, Report on Study of the Protracted Case, 21 F.R.D. 55, 61
(1957); Kaufman, supra note 26, at 115-16; McAlister, The Judicial Conference Handbook on
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 47 A.B.A.J. 568, 569-70 (1961); Procedural Prob-
lems, supra note 2, at 291; Withrow, supra note 25, at 428-29; Yankwich, supra note 1, at 83.
143 On the matter of delay, it is hardly disputable that modern discovery emphasizes
truth before absolute efficiency, as well it should. See Columbia Law School Confer-
ence, Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479 (1968). The number of
abuses possible under discovery procedures, however, makes quite a catalog. See 4
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.02[3] (2d ed. 1976). Most significantly, "liberal" discov-
ery has at times confused the parties when they might otherwise have been disposed to
settle. It has been claimed that this was true in the electrical equipment cases (see notes
14-20 and accompanying text supra), where the National Coordinating Committee not only
controlled discovery but, in effect, also initiated it. Sawyer, supra note 16, at 511-12. Cer-
tainly uncontrolled discovery can lead to hostility and impasse between parties, as was the
case in Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., Civil No. 44-482 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 8, 1948), which
remains one of the most protracted antitrust cases ever litigated. On the belated and frus-
trating efforts to undo the damage caused by extensive and unmanaged discovery in that
case, see Marsh, supra note 2, at 403-12; Noonan, supra note 2, at 394-400.
144 1970 MANUAL, supra note 18, at § 1.3; 1973 MANUAL § 1.20. The MANUAL asserts
that discovery must precede issue definition because "[olne of the purposes of discovery is
to discover information leading to amendments of pleadings narrowing or broadening the
issues." 1973 MANUAL 2 n.3, citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,
392 U.S. 134 (1968). The Perna Life case, however, had many words about the in pari
delicto defense, but few about discovery. It in no way precludes preliminary outlining of the
issues, any more than does the reasoning of the MANUAL. In fact, the "first wave" discovery
which the MANUAL proposes is to be limited to identification of files, witnesses, and transac-
tions. By the time "second wave" discovery (discovery on the merits) commences, the pre-
trial court is supposed to have sufficient familiarity with the case to prevent discovery into
uncontroverted and immaterial areas. 1973 MANUAL §§ 2.30, 2.40.
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been emphasized, discovery in large cases should ideally be con-
fined to material (not vaguely relevant) types of conduct, periods of
time, and areas of geography. 145 What is and is not material must
be weighed in the context of an informed judicial understanding of
contentions and proofs. In short, discovery cannot be allowed in
large cases merely on the rationale that it is relevant to the plead-
ings or that somehow, something may turn up.146 The need for
discovery must be appraised more coldly than that.
Such a chilly appraisal is permissible under the discretionary
and relatively unreviewable standards of Rules 26-37.47 As Judge
Weinstein said in Dolgow v. Anderson:
A trial court has a duty, of special significance in lengthy and
complex cases where the possibility of abuse is always present, to
supervise and limit discovery to protect parties and witnesses
from annoyance and excessive expense.14
Despite some possible prevarication, the Manual recommends
avoiding discovery into truly doubtful areas, 149 and other authori-
ties are in accord. 15 0
A good example of the control that ought to be exercised is
Professional Adjusting System of America, Inc. v. General Adjustment
Bureau, Inc.'51 In that 1972 treble-damage action, plaintiffs alleged
1'5 Examples of recent cases setting such limits are Carlson Companies, Inc. v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Minn. 1974) (imposed limits on inquiry into
capability of plaintiff to thrive in its industry "but for" alleged injuries); Professional Ad-
justing Sys. of America, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 1225
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (imposed geographical and temporal limits); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (imposed geographical limits); Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D.
661 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (imposed general cut-off on discovery). For an interesting earlier an-
titrust case, which limited the scope of discovery to a relatively narrow set of issues, see
United States v. Watchmakers Information Center, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
146 Recent antitrust cases endorsing a broad concept of relevance for discovery pur-
poses include: United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 180, 186, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three
separate orders); Maritime Cinema Serv. Corp. v. Movies En Route, Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); and Natcontainer Corp. v. Continental Can Co., 362 F. Supp. 1094
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). A recent case apparently relying on the "something may turn up" theory
of discovery is Allied Elec. Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
Nonetheless, it should be remembered that relevance in discovery does not depend upon
the pleadings alone, but rather looks to the real subject matter of the dispute. See 4 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.56[1] (2d ed. 1976).
147 That discovery rulings are discretionary, at least where the outside limits are being
framed, is generally recognized. See 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.56[l] (2d ed.
1976).
148 53 F.R.D. 661, 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
"9 1973 MANUAL, supra note 18, at § 2.40.
5 15 E.g., 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.5611] (2d ed. 1976).
15. 373 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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a conspiracy lasting from 1930 to 1971, and asked for interroga-
tory answers going back to 1952. The court held that to take dis-
covery back to 1952, despite the even longer chronology of plain-
tiffs' allegations, would unduly burden the defendant. It therefore
required answers only back to 1964, with the proviso that if discov-
ery revealed a need for still earlier discovery, then an appropriate
request would be considered later. As for the plaintiffs' request for
nationwide document production, the court decided that a more
appropriate geographical area would encompass only defendant's
New York headquarters and its branch offices in localities where it
competed with plaintiffs.
Another useful example, involving overreaching requests by
an antitrust defendant, is Carlson Companies, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutch-
inson Co. 152 There, the court set the outside limits of relevance and
denied detailed discovery into a seemingly peripheral damage area
where general discovery was already available.
The import of Professional Adjusting, Carlson, and other cases is
that discovery should go no further than is necessary to support or
defend each claim and defense. Discovery can hardly serve its pur-
pose of helping to define triable issues if it ranges too often into
peripheral areas. 153 Of course, knowledge of the pertinent facts is
necessary to frame issues, and such knowledge may be obtainable
only through discovery. The emphasis, however, should be upon
framing known issues-narrowing and clarifying them-not upon
finding merely colorable new issues. Discovery can best clarify key
issues when it is focused on those issues alone, as in discovery to
fend off summary judgment' 54 or to prepare for a separate trial on
less than all claims.
It is difficult to appraise the efficacy of discovery in large
cases, as we have attempted to do for the other pretrial devices,
152 374 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Minn. 1974).
153 One might contrast the case of Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
171 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ohio 1959), modified, 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 890 (1961), where lengthy discovery as to a party's foreign licensing arrangements
netted a number of interesting details but nothing of an admissible nature vis-h-vis domes-
tic "patent misuse" charges, with Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975),
where discovery was confined to United States markets ab initio. The Telex case is discussed
in notes 188-89 and accompanying text infra.
154 Rule 56(f) permits limited discovery for purposes of opposing a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Courts must be careful that such discovery does not hinder general dis-
covery where lengthy adjudication of the summary judgment motion seems likely. Cf. Wal-
dron v. British Petroleum Co., 38 F.R.D. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd sub nom. Waldron v.
Cities Service Co., 361 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Ser-
vice Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968), discussed in note 46 supra.
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because of the obvious and perpetual tension between the need for
knowledge of facts and the need for organization and resolution of
issues. It is easy enough to see that without early and regular con-
trol by the court,155 discovery can become a morass which is neither
speedy nor ultimately fruitful. We believe that such control is more
readily achieved through informal rather than formal procedures.
For instance, it has been suggested before' 56 and is now frequently
the rule157 that counsel must discuss their discovery disagreements
with each other before bringing them before the court. It has also
been suggested that discovery discussions before the court might
better proceed on oral argument alone, in hopes of encouraging
flexibility and candor rather than mere posturing for the record.
58
Of course, thoughtfully prepared motion papers do serve an edu-
cational function not readily duplicated by oral discussion, but the
limitations of paper arguments must still be recognized. The "give
and take" of compromise discussions, especially when conducted
before the court, can and do achieve a great deal in stripping cases
to their true essentials.
E. Summary Judgment
In several respects summary judgment under Rule 56 is the
heaviest "artillery" in the pretrial system. It can be used to elimi-
nate peripheral issues or even all issues with more freedom and
confidence than can orders to dismiss or strike under Rule 12. It
can be used to back up the court's pretrial authority under Rule 16,
and can itself be employed as a pretrial device for framing triable
issues 159 and trial proofs. 6 1 Of course, if summary judgment is
"I Supervision of discovery by special masters rather than by the court has often been
suggested (e.g., Biggs, A System of Masters, 23 F.R.D. 563 (1958)), sometimes tried (see, e.g.,
Marsh, supra note 2, at 403-04), and sometimes opposed (e.g., Decker, supra note 133, at
597-98).
'
56 Handbook, supra note 12, at 385; N.Y.U. Seminar Resolutions, supra note 133, at 521;
Stanford Seminar Resolutions, supra note 133, at 616.
'
5 7 E.g., C.D. CAL. R. 3(1); D. MINN. R. 5.
158 Doskow, Procedural Aspects of Discoveiy, 45 F.R.D. 498, 503-04 (1968).
159 See 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.20 (2d ed. 1976).
160 See Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
wherein the parties pared down the entire record in order to prepare summary judgment
exhibits, with the intention of using the exhibits as a major part of the trial evidence if
summary judgment were not allowed. A similar procedure was used in the Bethlehem-
Youngstown steel company merger case, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 157 F.
Supp. 877 & 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), and reportedly greatly shortened the time
actually spent in trial. See generally Bromley, supra note 13; McDowell, supra note 13; Rey-
craft, Practical Problems Presented in the Trials of Recent Merger Cases, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 635
(1959).
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used without careful regard for its overall impact on the litigation,
considerable delay and wasted effort may result.' 61
Summary judgment has been a regular topic in the literature
on the "big case." In the past it was frequently asserted that courts
should be more willing to employ summary judgment to dispose of
unworthy claims and cases, 162 and it is still said that early decisions
on peripheral issues are desirable, at least where the court exercises
due caution.' 63 This demonstrates one of the key problems with
effective use of summary judgment: namely, timidity about finding
matters ripe and suitable for summary adjudication. Such timidity
is based in part on a sort of gambler's logic that just one more bit of
discovery might save a party's case. 164 It may also be based upon
uncertainty about the rather arcane summary judgment stan-
dards, at least as they apply in antitrust cases.' 65 Despite such dif-
ficulties, however, summary judgments are granted fairly fre-
quently in antitrust cases.' 66 The real question is whether they
161 Summary judgment, so it is said, should not delay a real trial by substituting a "trial
by affidavits." 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE T 56.11[1-2] (2d ed. 1976). Trial by affidavit
would seem desirable enough as a time-saving device, however, were it not for the ready
reversibility of summary judgments.
162 Dooling, Cooperation Between Counsel in Simplifying Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 460,
465 (1958); Freund, supra note 43, at 574-77; Hays, The Use of Summary Judgment, 28 F.R.D.
126, 135 (1960); Searls, Methods of Shortening Trials, 23 F.R.D. 603 (1958). See also N.Y.U.
Seminiar Resolutions, supra note 133, at 520.
163 1973 MANUAL, supra note 18, at § 2.11.
164 See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 1972). But see
Searer v. West Michigan Telecasters, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 634, 638 (W.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd
mem., 524 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1975).
1'5 See 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.16 (2d ed. 1976).
166 Recent antitrust cases granting full summary judgment for defendants include:
ALW, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 510 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1975); Coniglio v. Highwood
Serv., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Driskill v.
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1974); Golden v. Kentile Floors,
Inc., 475 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1973) (summary judgment for one defendant only); Bushie v.
Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972); Mogul v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.
Supp. 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 527 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1976); Bay City-Abrahams
Bros. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Goldinger v. Boron Oil
Co., 375 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975); Kemp
Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc. v. Hartford Automobile Dealers' Ass'n, 380 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Conn.
1974); Romac Resources, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 378 F. Supp. 543 (D.
Conn. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Modern Home Institute, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 513 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1975); Searer v. West Michigan Telecasters, Inc., 381 F. Supp.
634 (W.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd mem., 524 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1975); Oak Distrib. Co. v.
Miller Brewing Co., 370 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
Cases granting partial summary judgment for defendants include: Capital Tem-
poraries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974); Seligson v. New York Produce
Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F.
Supp. 54 (D. Ore. 1973).
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might be granted yet more often under different standards.
The current standards in antitrust cases are based on four
leading Supreme Court decisions: Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting
Systems, Inc. ,167 First National Bank v. Cities Service Co.,168 Norfolk
Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc. 169 and Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co. 17" Three of these cases reversed summary judg-
ments for defendants, while the fourth, First National Bank, upheld
a summary judgment entered on behalf of one defendant. One
commentator has suggested that First National Bank is sui generis
because of its apparent deviation from the rule that summary
judgment is proper only where no available proof or inference
refutes the claim or defense being asserted. 17 1 Despite some am-
biguity, it appears that the majority in First National Bank did an-
nounce a lesser standard-that of deciding upon the most probable
inference rather than requiring the absence of alternative infer-
ences. Such a lesser standard may be tempting in lengthy and
protracted cases such as First National Bank, but it is not the earlier
standard, as enunciated in Poller, nor the later standard, as enun-
ciated in Norfolk Monument and Adickes. All three of those cases
held that any failure by the movant to conclusively disprove a dis-
puted material fact or factual inference must defeat the motion.
This standard is not as readily applicable as might appear, how-
ever, and if mechanically applied, it may be unnecessarily restric-
tive.
Recent antitrust rulings granting or denying summary judg-
ment have generally recited the absence or presence of a material
factual dispute.' 7 2 However, a number of these opinions contain
Cases granting partial or full summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs include: Kapp
v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Dobbins v. Kawasaki
Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54 (D. Ore. 1973); Anderson v. Home Style Stores, Inc., 58
F.R.D. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
167 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
168 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
169 394 U.S. 700 (1969).
170 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
171 10 B.C. INn. & CoMm. L. REV. 196, 201 (1968).
172E.g., ALW, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 510 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1975); Capital
Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 667 (2d Cir. 1974); Coniglio v. High-
wood Serv., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1291 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974);
Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1974); Good
Inv. Promotion, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891, 893 (6th Cir. 1974); Umden-
stock, v. American Mtg. & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d 589, 592 (10th Cir. 1974); Golden v. Kentile
Floors, Inc., 475 F.2d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1973); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116,
118-19 (9th Cir. 1972); Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 1972);
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remarks that appear to refine, if not alter, the general rule. 173 One
of the most interesting articulations of a precise standard appeared
in Romac Resources, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 174 a
case involving a disappointed supplier to the insurance company
defendants. In granting summary judgment for defendants, the
district court held that as to plaintiff's particular proofs: (1) an
unsupported hope to discredit defendants' witnesses was not
enough to withstand summary judgment; and (2) the existence of
deliberate, parallel conduct was not, of itself, an antitrust violation
or sufficient proof of conspiracy. The court concluded that there
could be no reasonable doubt as to the merits, and therefore a jury
decision would be improper. 75
Another interesting evaluation was made in Goldinger v. Boron
Oil Co. ,176 a case brought by an alleged "distributor" of defendant's
products. Defendant insisted that plaintiff was in fact its employee,
and moved for summary adjudication. The court granted the mo-
tion, stating that no dispute as to credibility existed, and that the
only disputes extant concerned the meaning of a few unambiguous
documents. The interpretation of the documents was held to be
purely a question of law. Similarly, in Bay City-Atbrahams Brothers,
Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc.,'177 another case of a terminated "dis-
tributor," the court held that however the factual disputes might be
resolved, there was no legal theory upon which an antitrust viola-
tion could be based.
In each of these cases, the judge apparently felt that no
reasonable merit existed in the plaintiff's claim and that further
argument as to which "facts" could or could not be disputed was
Mogul v. General Motors Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 527
F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1976); Kemp Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc. v. Hartford Automobile Dealers'
Ass'n, 380 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Conn. 1974); Searer v. West Michigan Telecasters, Inc.,
381 F. Supp. 634, 643 (W.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd mem., 524 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1975); Selig-
son v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076, 1089-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Dobbins v.
Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54, 60-61 (D. Ore. 1973); Oak Distrib. Co. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 370 F. Supp. 889, 895-97 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Elektra Indus., Inc. v. Honey-
well, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 118, 120 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
173 E.g., ALW, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 510 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1975); Mogul v.
General Motors Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1305, 1307-08 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd mem., 527 F.2d
645 (3d Cir. 1976).
174 378 F. Supp. 543 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Modern Home Institute, Inc. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1975).
17 The court of appeals affirmed, citing First National Bank as authority. 513 F.2d at
109.
176 375 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975).
177 375 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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therefore immaterial. In other recent cases, however, clearcut in-
stances of empty claims or per se liability have been diverted from
the summary judgment route by judicial insistence that more facts
be developed before the merits are finally considered. 178
It is true that the standards for summary judgment are seman-
tic formulations with a certain elasticity in complex antitrust fact
situations. Nonetheless, to the extent that they are actually adhered
to, they unnecessarily restrict the trial process if they do not permit
the disposal of obviously invalid or unprovable claims. Although
summary judgment should not be used where a real chance exists
of the challenged party discovering substantial evidence for his
claim or defense, we strongly assert that it is a waste of time and an
encouragement of arbitrary results to refuse to dismiss claims
that, even if supported by a jury verdict, would likely be set aside
on a motion for a new trial. 179 It is for the court to determine what
constitutes a sustainable claim, jury trial notwithstanding. The only
possible effect of pressing the right to a jury trial is repetition of
trial after trial until either the court gives in and allows what
178 E.g., Good Inv. Promotion, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891 (6th Cir.
1974); Umdenstock v. American Mtg. & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974); Littlejohn
v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972); Carlson Companies, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutch-
inson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Minn. 1974); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389
F. Supp. 867, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
'79 This proposed standard for summary judgment is not accepted at this time. As
Professor Moore, a stout devotee of a very restrictive rule, states:
The court may not properly grant summary judgment to the movant on the belief
that if the case went to trial and the opposing party obtained a verdict the court
would, in the exercise of a sound discretion, set the verdict aside as against the
weight of the evidence and grant a new trial.
6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.15[6] (2d ed. 1976). Since Professor Moore also has a
very strict standard for granting new trials-such orders are proper only where the jury
verdict is a "seriously erroneous result" amounting to a miscarriage of justice (6A id.
59.08[5])-it is difficult to see why, in his view, summary judgment is not desirable in
cases where a jury verdict could not be sustained.
An interesting recent article asserts, similarly to Moore, that in certain instances the
standard for summary judgment should be the same standard as would be applied if the
party were requesting a directed verdict on the issue after trial. Louis, Federal Summary
Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 748-49 (1974). Nonetheless, the
Louis article propounds a serious suggestion for strengthening summary judgment mo-
tions, and it is difficult to see how the suggestion, if logically followed, would not approach
the standard for summary judgment suggested here. The basic premise of the Louis article
is that a party moving for summary judgment, if he would not have the burden of proof at
trial, should not have the total burden of proof during summary judgment proceedings.
Once such a movant has presented a prima facie defense against one or more essential
premises of the opponent's claim, the latter must come forward and present his own prima
facie case or a good excuse for not doing do. In this format, summary judgment would test
whether a claimant has a chance of meeting his burden of proof and therefore deserves a
full trial.
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amounts to a miscarriage of justice, or else a jury finally decides the
factual questions in what the court considers a rational manner.
Given the many tools of the judiciary for expediting and refining
cases, summary judgment procedures should not be held in
abeyance by excessive fear of trespassing upon merely theoretical
jury trial rights. 180 It has often been remarked, 81 and may well
remain true, that summary judgments are too sparingly used in
large cases. If so, the use of more liberal, more realistic, and above
all, more probative standards might help.
Of course, the net impact of summaryjtrdgment motions upon
the expeditious handling of large litigations greatly depends on
their timing. A summary judgment motion made before discovery
had been effected may simply delay or distort the course of
discovery.' 8 2 Used in conjunction with pretrial schedules and pro-
cedures, on the other hand, a summary judgment motion may be
quite useful in sharpening issues and proofs. 83 Coming at the end
of pretrial proceedings, such motions may indeed become the core
of the trial itself if the summary judgment proofs are transformed
into trial proofs when the motions themselves fail. This latter situa-
tion has been especially common in nonjury cases where the sum-
mary judgment process has occasionally created an almost com-
plete trial record and has honed down the trial itself to a quick
analysis of credibility.' 84 The important point, whether or not a
jury trial is contemplated, is that the parties be discouraged from
bringing premature summary judgment motions. They should be
required to work within an overall pretrial schedule.
Summary judgment completes the pretrial process. It is both
the most potent instrument and one of the principal goals of pre-
180 In fact, the summary judgment proposals of the Louis article (see note 179 supra), if
carefully exercised, would expose weak cases in time to defeat a request for jury determi-
nation and would strengthen those cases which truly merit a jury trial.
181 Dooling, supra note 162, at 465; Freund, supra note 43, at 574-77; Hays, supra note
162, at 135; Kohn, supra note 16, at 504; N.Y.U. Seminar Resolutions, supra note 133, at 520;
Stanford Seminar Resolutions, supra note 133, at 615.
182 See, e.g., Umdenstock v. American Mtg. & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974);
Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co.,
38 F.R.D. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391
U.S. 253 (1968), discussed in note 46 supra.
183 See, e.g., Kemp Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc. v. Hartford Automobile Dealers Ass'n, 380 F.
Supp. 1382 (D. Conn. 1974); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54 (D. Ore. 1973).
184 Such was the procedure used in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 157 F.
Supp. 877 & 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where the trial lasted only 18 days and
was conducted largely on a prepared record. See note 160 supra.
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trial work. Next to trial itself, a summary judgment proceeding is
the most thorough possible adjudication of the merits of an action,
and if it cannot dispose of some or all important issues, it can
frame the final trial of those issues. To recapitulate, if used with
judicious timing (via pretrial timetables), summary judgment
(1) enhances and completes judicial control of the large action,
(2) demands an awareness of the merits in advance of possible trial,
(3) promotes efficiency and speed, even if partially or fully denied,
and (4) demands accurate assessments in order to be fair, effective,
and (most pragmatically) immune from subsequent reversal.
IV
A SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL CONTROL
The discussion above posits that early, firm, active, and con-
tinuousjudicial control is the sine qua non of successful adjudication
of large cases. This view is not new, nor is it unique; it is, in fact,
something of a homily by now.1 8 5 When one gets down to the
details of its application, however, one finds it to be a view that
many judges and attorneys avoid. The fear of chilling the adver-
sary nature of our jurisprudence, the fear of squelching free dis-
covery, the fear of eliminating an issue before it faces the sup-
posedly unique chemistry of jury evaluation, and the refusal to
separate the material from the immaterial, save in the last resort,
have all led to a continuing reluctance to apply the ethic of control.
Yet there is no choice. So long as issues and proofs remain over-
lapping, redundant, and confused, a fair adjudication cannot be
had without considerable judicial intervention. This has been said
before and is hardly a surprise to the antitrust bar, either defen-
dants' or plaintiffs'. 86
But how has control worked in practice, in the "real world" of
everyday litigation? One way to begin answering this question is to
consider several large antitrust cases. The samples chosen here are
three computer industry cases, the gypsum wallboard cases, and
the antibiotics industry (tetracycline) cases.
85 "There are no inherently protracted cases, only cases which are unnecessarily pro-
tracted by inefficient procedures and managements." 1973 MANUAL, supra note 18, at ix.
"There are no unmanageable cases. There are only lazy judges." Hon. Miles W. Lord, D.
Minn., quoted in The $175 Million Rx, TiME, March 4, 1974, at 86.
86See generally Blecher, The Plaintiff's Viewpoint, 38 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 50 (1969);
Bromley, supra note 13.
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A. The Computer Cases
The first of the computer cases, Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp. ,187
began with the filing of a complaint in the Northern District of
Oklahoma in January 1972, was tried on the merits in 1973,188 and
was reviewed on the merits by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in late 1974 and early 1975. Backtracking slightly, in April
1972 the case was transferred to the District of Minnesota for
coordinated pretrial proceedings with two other actions. In those
other cases, one filed in 1968 and the other in 1970, the parties
had nearly completed their discovery proceedings, and Telex was
able to avail itself of a considerable portion of that work. In
January 1973 the Telex action was remanded to Oklahoma, and in
April a comprehensive pretrial order was entered, enumerating
issues, documents, and witnesses for trial. The trial itself, without
jury, was held during a six-week period in April and May. Post-trial
proceedings took place in the summer and fall, and a final set of
findings and conclusions was issued in November 1973. Of course,
the court of appeals reversed the major decision of the trial court,
but on a point of substantive law (definition of the relevant mar-
kets) rather than on procedural infirmities. Thus, this large and
well-known case went through most if not all of the litigation pro-
cess, on the merits, within about three years.' 89
Honeywell, Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp.,'9 " the second computer
case, began in May 1967 with two separately filed actions, which
were consolidated in the District of Minnesota in May 1968.
Amended and expanded complaints were allowed at that time and
in August 1969, and pretrial orders were issued in July 1970 and
March 1971. The trial, without jury, ran some 135 days, from June
1971 to March 1972. It reportedly involved some seventy-one
"live" and eighty "canned" witnesses, over 30,000 marked exhibits,
and over 20,000 pages of transcript. Comprehensive findings and
conclusions were entered in October 1973.191 Thus, the case con-
sumed roughly six and one-half years from filing to trial court
decision on the merits.
187 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rei'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 802 (1975).
188 Id. See the district court opinion for this and other aspects of the case's progress.
189 Telex and IBM recently agreed to terminate their actions against each other, with
neither side making payment of any kind. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1975, at 33, col. 5.
19" 1974-1 CCH TRADE GAS. V 74,874 (D. Minn. 1973).
191 Id.
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In the third computer case, United States v. IBM Corp.,192 the
suit began over seven years ago, on January 17, 1969, and finally
commenced an anticipated one to two-year nonjury trial on May
19, 1975.193 The case originally languished with little or no activity
until early 1972, when it was assigned for all purposes to Judge
Edelstein of the Southern District of New York. During the past
three years a considerable amount of discovery has apparently
taken place, but much of it has involved a fierce dispute about the
destruction of alleged "work product" materials. 194 In July 1973
IBM sought and was refused an early separate trial on the defini-
tion of the "relevant markets" concerned; Judge Edelstein held
that such a trial would not lead to complete resolution of any of the
counts of the United States' complaint.1 95 However, in January
1975 the United States sought and obtained leave to file an
amended complaint adding allegations similar to those found to be
true by the district court in the Telex action.' 96 By this measure, it
brought in issues as to the "plug compatible peripherals" market
which had been litigated in Oklahoma, while retaining its original
issues as to the larger data-processing business. Ironically, just after
the United States moved into the "peripherals" area, the collateral
support for that move was destroyed by the Tenth Circuit's rever-
sal of the Telex district court's market findings. As of this writing,
then, the United States' IBM case is well past its seventh birthday,
not only without having been fully tried, but also without having
reached the stage of clearcut issue definition.
B. The Gypsum Cases
As for the gypsum wallboard cases, it should first be noted that
this price-fixing litigation has involved not one plaintiff but many,
and not only single litigants but class actions as well. 197 The first
gypsum cases, filed in 1966 in the Northern District of California,
were brought by dealers (direct purchasers). Subsequent cases were
192 See Civil No. 69-200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 7, 1975) (adding new allegations as to
markets and conduct).
193 "The nonjury trial is expected to take a year to complete. Judge Edelstein . . . is
expected to take another year to reach his decision." N.Y. Times, May 20, 1975, at 53,
col. 8.
"9 See United States v. IBM Corp., 62 F.R.D. 530 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 493 F.2d
112 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974) (one of several "work product" opinions).
195 Id., 60 F.R.D. 654, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
19 6 Id., 66 F.R.D. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
197 Aspects of the gypsum cases are discussed in notes 59, 66-68 and accompanying
text supra.
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transferred to Judge Zirpoli in the Northern District of California
and those not involving dealers' claims were put on a "back-
burner" status as to discovery and trial. In October 1969 the "pilot"
trial of the dealer actions began. Heard without jury, it encom-
passed only issues of liability and impact, and concluded less than
five months later in mid-March 1970. A complete decision was
handed down exactly one year later.' 98 Since that decision resulted
in a finding of liability, a further nonjury trial on damages was
commenced in December 1971. Final findings and conclusions on
damages were released in the spring of 1973.199 Meanwhile, Judge
Zirpoli had indicated that his liability findings would be given col-
lateral estoppel effect in a subsequent trial of the "back-burner"
cases. Later in 1973, before the decisions in the dealer cases were
appealed or any further trial was commenced, settlements involv-
ing very substantial sums were finalized .2 '"' The total time from
commencement to settlement was roughly seven years for the old-
est cases and as little as one year for others.
C. The Antibiotics Cases
The final example is the complex, marathon, antibiotics litiga-
tion. Beginning with an FTC investigation and complaint in the
late 1950's,201 continuing with an indictment brought in 1961, tried
first in 1967 and again in 1973,2112 the antibiotics litigation picked
up its first treble-damage action in 1964. Other actions came later,
particularly in 1968, with some cases being filed as recently as late
1974-right up to the presumed running of the statute of limita-
tions.
In 1968 coordinated pretrial proceedings commenced in the
Southern District of New York before Judge Inzer Wyatt,20 3 and
various class actions were settled in 1969 and 1973. In the interim,
the Honorable Miles W. Lord was designated a judge of the South-
ern District for purposes of continuing the "nonsettling" pretrial
proceedings. 4 In the spring of 1971 Judge Lord transferred most
198 Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
'
99 Id., 357 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
2'1See In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F. Supp. 959, 961 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See also Furth
& Burns, supra note 31, at 886, 897.
201 See American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 761-62 (6th Cir. 1966).
202 See United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), modified, 437 F.2d
957 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 404 U.S. 548 (1972), on
remand, 367 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
203 In re Antibiotic Drugs Antitrust Actions, 295 F. Supp. 1402 (J.P.M.L. 1968).
204 Id., 320 F. Supp. 586 (J.P.M.L. 1970).
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of the pending cases to his home forum, the District of Minne-
sota. 2115 There certain remaining actions (the United States' dam-
age claims, the claims of insurers and union welfare funds, and
those of several competitors) were consolidated for trial. Trial
commenced in November 1974 before two juries-one for the
"purchaser" actions, another for the "competitor" ones. Today the
saga of this case continues apace, but it hardly provides any insight
into the effective management of large antitrust litigations. Indeed,
a mistrial was declared in August 1976, although the main com-
petitor case was settled in August 1975.2o6
Meanwhile, in early 1973 a North Carolina class action was
remanded to its home forum and tried without jury later that
year. 2117 The claims of foreign government plaintiffs, however, still
remain to be adjudicated. Aside from the more recently filed ac-
tions, the litigation has run for roughly nineteen years; it has been
twelve years since the first civil suit was filed and eight years since
coordinated pretrial proceedings began.
D. The Practical Lessons of Large Cases
What lessons, if any, may be drawn from this small sampling
of large cases? Perhaps it should first be noted that most were tried
(or are being tried) without a jury. To be sure, these nonjury trials
have run the gamut in length from six to twenty weeks, with a trial
duration of up to two years being predicted for United States v.
IBM. Nonetheless, it must be conceded that each of these trials was
completed more quickly than would have been possible with a jury.
The time spent before and after these nonjury trials in marshalling
proofs and arguments may be considered part of the overall trial
time, but such chores would have been needed for a jury trial too,
along with a good many others. Spared the formal, sometimes
theatrical presentations of a jury trial, the participants were pre-
sumably able to devote considerably more time to reflection upon
and discussion of the substantive issues.208
205 In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y.), mandamus denied sub
nom. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971).
206 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1975, at 49, col. 1 (settlement); Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 1976,
at 7, col. 2 (Judge Lord cited effect of prejudicial pretrial publicity on jurors in declaring
mistrial).
207 North Carolina v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 384 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
... For an example of the sort of reflection sometimes engaged in by an antitrust jury,
see Hospital Television, Inc. v. Wells Television, Inc., 462 F.2d 417 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1024 (1972). The case consumed 13 days of trial and 30 pages of instructions; the
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The absence of a jury, however, does not alone guarantee
expedited proceedings; witness the immobility of United States v.
IBM. The Telex trial, in contrast, was fairly speedy, but at least
three other factors distinguish that case from United States v. IBM.
One was the lack of tangential issues in Telex. As the decision in
that case notes,20 9 trial issues were from the beginning geographi-
cally confined to domestic American sales. On the other hand, it
appears that United States v. IBM has been and will remain bogged
down in peripheral matters. Between the inordinate attention paid
to "work product" discovery and the Justice Department's belated
interjection of a whole new market category in order to track the
district court's decision in Telex, the IBM litigation has had consid-
erable difficulty focusing upon even its own very broad issues.
A second factor making for speed in the Telex trial was an
apparently thorough-going pretrial order. The order came just
days before trial, and on each day of the trial, preparatory discus-
sions were held to insure organizational continuity. As was stressed
in the McAllister article of a quarter century ago, proofs and issues
must be confined at some point to discrete bundles or neither can
possibly be evaluated. 10 It is the goal of a good pretrial order to do
just that.
A third expediting factor, which initially lies outside the con-
trol of the pretrial court, is the attitude of the attorneys involved.
If, as in Telex, both sides truly desire a prompt determination, then
speed will very likely result. If, however, as in United States v. IBM,
one side or the other expresses rather minimal interest in prepar-
ing its case, then progress will be harder to achieve.21'
In addition to the three factors distinguishing Telex from
United States v. IBM, other factors making for efficient and accurate
adjudication are apparent in our case sample. In speaking of the
role of the parties, consider again the gypsum cases. Use there of
the "test case" device along with a bifurcated first trial undoubtedly
let all concerned, "front" and "back-burner" parties alike, make the
most thorough possible evaluation of their positions. Preparation
and settlement of the many class actions proceeded to an unusual
jury, however, required but 20 minutes of deliberation to reach a verdict for the defen-
dant. The speedy verdict was upheld on appeal.
209 367 F. Supp. at 258, 268.
210 The Big Case, supra note 2, at 55-57.
211 Cf. United States v. IBM, 66 F.R.D. 223, 228-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (rejecting IBM's
charge that United States' belated motion for leave to amend constituted bad faith).
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extent in light of the facts and not in any darkness.212
Finally, perhaps the most critical factor of all is the extent to
which pretrial procedures are integrated with the trial proper, so
that the entire litigation becomes an efficient process for narrowing
and resolving disputed issues. In three of the sample litigations
discussed, it is obvious that the entire course of the litigation was
effectively "the trial." In Telex, Honeywell, and the gypsum cases,
determination and resolution of'material issues occurred before,
during, and after the formal trial period itself. Even in the antibi-
otics cases, it is probable that the pretrial airing of damage theories
was instrumental in encouraging the numerous settlements and in
formulating the remaining issues.213 In United States v. IBM, how-
ever, despite the strong and experienced efforts of Judge Edel-
stein, it seems that pretrial maneuvering may have become an end
in itself, not integrally related to resolution of the issues.
In sum, we reject the view that judicial control is to be feared.
The real work in disposing of complex cases on their merits comes
largely in the pretrying and settling processes. Unfortunately, this
work-unlike a full, formal trial-has never been considered a
wholly legitimate part of Anglo-American adversary jurisprudence.
Yet, the only rights likely to go by the boards under strong judicial
control are the illusory tactical "rights" to obfuscate and to stall.214
Issues and proofs must be refined at some point, and to the extent
that pretrial proceedings accomplish that, counsel have done their
traditional job well. As for the right to a jury trial, good pretrial
work should at least insure that the jury's task will be limited to
true jury issues and be accomplished with a minimum of fatigue
and duress.
The true conflict over firm judicial control of large cases is of a
different philosophical order. The deductive mind takes pre-
defined legal principles and attempts to shape the pertinent facts
to those principles. The inductive mind sweeps the ground for all
possible facts and only then considers the legal categories into
212 It is not clear, however, that test cases can be used in conjunction with collateral
estoppel to summarily dispose of complex litigations, at least absent the consent of all
concerned. See notes 89-93 and accompanying text supra.
211 See the March 21, 1974, order approving the settlement of the six pending state
class actions. Order, Kansas v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Civil Nos. 4-71-392, 393, 395, 397, 399,
400, 401 (D. Minn.).
214 On the other hand, some psychological tests indicate that the traditional adversary
trial process-involving a passive rather than active judicial role-fosters objectivity on the
part of judges. See Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal De-
cisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386, 397-401 (1972).
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which they should be grouped. There is, of course, much to be said
for both of these approaches. But our judicial system, which seeks
the timely resolution of legal disputes, must tend to favor the first
sort of truth seeking over the latter. Given the finite resources of
parties and courts, this is for the better. An antitrust litigation is an
adjudication, not a roving legislative or literary investigation, and
efficiency must remain an important value to judges, lawyers, and
litigants alike.
V
THE "BIG CASE" AND SUBSTANTIVE ANTITRUST LAW
Perhaps the ultimate philosophical conflict in the antitrust area
arises in the class action/parens patriae215 sphere discussed earlier.
The more a court processes millions of "two dollar" claims, 21 6 the
more it becomes like an administrative body and less a finder of
specific legal and factual truths-particularly as to impact and
damages.21 7 Of course, to the extent that a court can expeditiously
dispose of class allegations as improper under Rule 23, or effec-
tively table them until the merits have initally been determined,218
class action claims possess a certain manageability. But the ques-
tion often raised in recent opinions219 and discussions22 1° remains;
namely, whether it is better to concentrate on the adjudication of
large damage claims or small ones.
A true concern for the small claimant might suggest the de-
sirability of more preventive antitrust work and less obsession with
small cures. The stiffer criminal penalities for antitrust violations
recently enacted under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act 221 are a positive step in this direction. The current interest in
ending the federal regulatory agencies' often negative impact on
2 15 See note 114 supra.
216 For a case literally involving two dollar antitrust claims, see Laveson v. TWA, 471
F.2d 76 (3d Cir, 1972).
2
'
7 See Collen, supra note 31, at 1056.
218 Two cases which effectively tabled many class allegations past initial determinations
of liability were Katz and the gypsum cases. See notes 89-93, 197-200 and accompanying
text supra.
'I9 Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 235 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 963 (1975); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 91 (9th Cir. 1974); Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin ("Eisen III"), 479 F.2d 1005, 1018-20 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156
(1974).
220 Symposium on Antitrust Class Actions, supra note 24, at 321-50.
221 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. V, 1975).
1976]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
competition is another,222 although any tightening of antitrust im-
munities that now exist because of agency action could stimulate
new areas of litigation.223
Perhaps the ultimate in preventive measures is the oft-intro-
duced, never-passed, Industrial Reorganization Act authored by
Senator Hart.224 This legislation seeks to restructure allegedly con-
centrated industries by way of special proceedings in an "Industrial
Reorganization Court." Such proceedings would ostensibly be re-
medial rather than penal in character and would turn upon the
establishment or rebuttal of certain key presumptions regarding
the existence of "monopoly power" in a given "line of commerce."
Procedures would be flexible, with emphasis on judicial interven-
tion in the calling of witnesses and experts, and review would be
quite limited.
Would any of this really result in significant and reasonably
attainable competitive changes? One can be skeptical for a number
of reasons. First, it is not clear just how investigations and com-
plaints under the "reorganization" process would affect other liti-
gations concerning the same subject matter. Second, the very pro-
cedural flexibility granted to the Industrial Reorganization Court
might encourage endless wrangles about the procedures to be
used.225 Third, the supposedly simple presumptions of monopoly
power are not clear in their impact on the burden of proof22 6 and
would not prevent extensive and complex investigations into
mitigating and exculpatory rebuttal proofs. 22 7 Fourth, the hope
that "reorganization" cases would focus upon remedies rather than
liability228 has little chance of realization, especially since innovative
222 See, e.g., Testimony of Thomas E. Kauper on airline deregulation before the Senate
Administrative Practices Subcommittee (Feb. 6, 1975), reported in 1975 BNA ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. No. 700, at E-1 (Feb. 11, 1975); Bureau of National Affairs interview
with Mr. Kauper, id. No. 705, at AA-1 (Mar. 18, 1975).
221 Of interest here is the recent Hart-Kennedy bill, S. 2028, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), which would authorize the FTC and the Antitrust Division to review federal agency
action appearing to have an anticompetitive impact. If enacted, S. 2028 would allow some
antitrust disputes to be thrashed out on their merits through prompt, informal action.
224 Reintroduced most recently on June 17, 1975, as S. 1959, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).221 See National Association of Manufacturers, Legal Analysis of S. 1167, in The Indus-
trial Reorganization Act, Hearings on S. 1167 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 93, 97-106 (1973).
226 See Note, The Industrial Reorganization Act: An Antitrust Proposal to Restructure the
American Economy, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 635, 670-73 (1973).
227 See Industrial Reorganization Act Hearings, supra note 225, at 353 (statement of Hon.
Philip Neville).
228 See Hart, Restructuring the Oligopoly Sector: The Case for a New "Industrial Reorganiza-
tion Act," 5 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. No. 4, at 35 & 6 id. No. 1, at 47 (1972).
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decrees have not been a strong point of recent governmental en-
forcement actions. 229 In light of its vague standards and unwieldy
procedures, the proposed Industrial Reorganization Act would
simplify very little.
A better approach would be to establish a study group to
propose specific changes for industries in need of reform. Under
this format, carefully tailored reorganizational legislation would be
deferred until after completion of the preliminary analysis z.2 31 At-
torney General Levi has recently advanced such a proposal, based
on a plan for a five-year commission which would examine in
depth without examining indefinitely.
23
'
Another legislative proposal with ample potential for en-
couraging protracted proceedings is the parens partriae bill enacted
by Congress and signed by the President just before this Article
went to press in late 1976.232 This legislation, which is part of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, makes an
end run around current limitations upon antitrust suits brought by
amorphous aggregations of claimants who neither desire nor qual-
ify for class status under Rule 23. As was pointed out by the former
head of the Antitrust Division, Professor Thomas Kauper, this
law has a negligible practical "interface" with existing Rule 23
procedures,2 33 and the litigation of conflicts may be prodigious.
Despite minimal notice and "opt-out" provisions, conflicts of in-
terest between the state attorney general and the individuals pro-
tected by him may also produce a host of procedural snarls.234
Moreover, the assessment of aggregated damages will undoubtedly
face initial due process challenges.
Of course, such objections would not be dispositive if the other
goals of the law were clear. Protection of individual consumers is
an oft-professed goal, but existing Rule 23 procedures already
provide protection for claims of any substance, with safeguards for
all concerned. The parens patriae provisions of the new law encour-
229 See National Association of Manufacturers, Legal Analysis, supra note 225, at
121-24.
2so See Note, supra note 226, at 675.
21 Reported in 1975 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 719, at A-5 (June 24,
1975).
232 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90
Stat. 1383.
233 Remarks of Mr. Kauper before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee
(May 7, 1975), reported in 1975 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 713, at D-1 (May
13, 1975).
234 See remarks of Milton Handler, Esq., before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcommittee (June 3, 1974), reported in id. No. 718, at D-I (June 17, 1975).
19761
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
age states to collect upon insubstantial and difficult-to-prove dam-
age claims by offering a windfall to state treasuries and outside
counsel. The provisions also provide an extra measure of deter-
rence. The former is not usually considered a legitimate goal of the
antitrust laws, while the latter, as has been discussed above, is bet-
ter served by more direct measures. Thus, the parens patriae law
supports "two dollar" claims without carefully considering funda-
mental antitrust objectives, much less secondary matters such as
efficient antitrust adjudication. Indeed, the entire Act makes virtu-
ally no effort to address considerations of judicial economy, and
even those few procedural improvements found in earlier ver-
sions2 35 have been dropped.
The import of this discussion, obviously, is that legislative or
judicial changes regarding purely substantive antitrust questions
may have highly significant procedural ramifications. Central to
the problem of complexity of procedure is complexity of proof,
and crucial to the latter problem is the degree to which a court can
classify challenged conduct as illegal per se. The more a court is
required to ascertain reasonableness, particularly in complex ques-
tions of monopoly under section two of the Sherman Act and di-
minution of competition under section seven of the Clayton Act,
the lengthier and denser become the pretrial and trial proceed-
ings. 236 This is not to suggest that all categories of conduct should
be tested with simple "per se" touchstones-although such a de-
velopment might actually aid business planning-but it is to sug-
gest that trade-offs always exist between accuracy and speed where
a total analysis of a situation is desired. A further question is
whether the courts are adequately equipped to assess economic and
social reasonableness, at least on a national scale.237 Such assess-
ments may be more appropriate for special study bodies, as sug-
gested above.
Perhaps the important point to remember in considering the
impact of new antitrust provisions is that the courts cannot do it all.
They cannot be expected to unscramble every snarl without some
delay, confusion, and frustration resulting. Legislative foresight
233 See S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 702 (1975).
236 See Dissent of Louis B. Schwartz in ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 390, 392 (1955); Schenefield, Annual Sur'e. of Anti-
trust Developinnts-Class Actions, Mergers, and Market Definition: A New Trend Toward Neutral-
ity, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 299, 344-45 (1975).
237 See National Association of Manufacturers, Legal Analysis, supra note 225, at
115-24.
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and careful drafting are needed if new laws are to deliver either
substantive or procedural reform.
VI
SOME PROPOSALS
Some modest specific suggestions have already been made in
the course of separately discussing coordination of multiple ac-
tions, class suits, discovery, and summary judgment. Other more
general suggestions have been made or implied throughout this
Article. In essence, we advocate early organization and control of
large cases, with control of the issues as a foundation for control
of discovery. Pretrial and post-trial activities must be seen as a
continuum with the trial itself. Moreover, we believe that greater
use of "test case" devices would expedite the handling of complex
litigations.
Three further proposals deserve mention. First, it would seem
sensible to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to allow transfer of actions for
all purposes, not merely for pretrial proceedings. The de facto
power sometimes exercised by section 1407 transferee courts to
retain and try cases should be made de jure.238
Second, greater use should be made of Rule 68, which pro-
vides in part:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an
offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or
property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then
accrued.
The offeree has ten days to accept the offer, after which it will be
deemed withdrawn. However,
[i]f the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred
after the making of the offer.
Offers may also be made in the same manner and to the same
effect after a determination of liability, but before a determination
of damages. The penalty provided in Rule 68 is similar to that in
238 Such is the suggestion made in Note, supra note 17, at 1036-40. See also J.P.M.L.
RULE 11(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1407 nt. (Supp. V, 1975).
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28 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132 (failure to meet jurisdictional amount) and
in Rule 37(c) (failure to admit).
It has been stated that the purpose of Rule 68 is to "encourage
settlements and avoid protracted litigation. '239 Under Rule 68,
however, an offer must be "unconditional" 240 and must include all
costs to date; thus, the Rule may be insufficiently flexible to work
with the complex settlement offers made in large antitrust litiga-
tions. 241 Perhaps judicial interpretation will rise to the occasion, but
a better solution would be to amend the Rule so as to encompass
conditional offers and offers excluding some or all accrued costs.
The principle would be the same, but more readily followed. Cer-
tainly a claimant should be obligated to consider a reasonable set-
tlement offer before rejecting it out of hand, and a good faith
offeror should not bear the brunt of the offeree's rash rejection. 242
Third, further efforts should be made to eliminate jury trials
in antitrust cases. A jury demand complicates almost every facet of
pretrial management and causes the trial to loom as an artifically
segregated, theatrical, and prolonged experience. Nonetheless, the
seventh amendment guarantees a jury trial in antitrust damage
actions,243 and only an unlikely constitutional amendment would
remove the right. Other measures, however, might be used to
make a jury trial less desirable. Informal pressures from the bench
and the desire to "get things done" have already caused parties to
waive their right to a jury in some large cases. Since a major ob-
stacle to such a waiver is the fear of possible judicial bias,24 4 non-
jury trials would be encouraged if parties were allowed one peremp-
tory recusal as to the presiding judge. This suggestion, recently
advanced by Chief Judge Devitt of the District of Minnesota,245
229 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 68.01[4] (2d ed. 1975), quoting the 1946 Commit-
tee Note on the amended version of Rule 68. Accord, Staffend v. Lake Central Airlines,
Inc., 47 F.R.D. 218, 219 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
240 See generally 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 68.04 (2d ed. 1975).
241 See, e.g., the description of the 1969 antibiotics settlement in West Virginia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1082-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
242 For an exploration of more radical techniques for forcing settlements through judi-
cial action, see Dole, supra note 71, at 1000-06.
242 Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See also 5 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.37[2] (2d ed. 1976).
244 See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972).
245 Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should be Abolished, 60 A.B.A.J. 570 (1974). Judge
Devitt further suggested that the recusal statute be amended to allow recusal for cause
whenever impartiality can reasonably be questioned and that jury fees (taxable as costs) be
levied. In response to Judge Devitt's article, one author has asserted that while the Judge's
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would require an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 144. Although this
procedure might temporarily detract from continuity, it would
more than compensate by encouraging the calm and expeditious
adjudication of facts and law.
CONCLUSION
The experience of the last twenty-five years has confirmed the
wisdom of the early studies in calling for aggressive pretrial man-
agement of large antitrust cases. Speed and efficiency in adjudica-
tion have significantly increased through improved judicial han-
dling of such pretrial devices as multidistrict transfers, class action
certifications, pretrial conferences, and summary judgment mo-
tions. Still better control could be achieved if attorneys and judges
would squarely face the fact that the pretrial period is where the
merits of most cases are decided. Excessive deference to the con-
cepts of adversary jurisprudence, wide-open discovery, and trial by
jury serves only to impede the issue clarification necessary for fair
and expeditious adjudication of complex cases. Since the vast ma-
jority of cases never reach trial, justice is better served by pretrial
attention to the actual worth of the claims presented. For those few
cases that do reach trial, the pretrial process can greatly simplify
the jury's task by narrowing the issues to those basic factual ques-
tions truly in dispute. Ultimately, the large antitrust case should be
viewed as a continuum of defining, refining, and resolving factual
and legal issues. The pretrial period should be the formative part
of the trial, not something apart from the trial as such. A case
handled in this manner will be determined more quickly, or at least
more smoothly and soundly.
premises as to the low value of jury trial were wrong, his ideas about recusal still made
sense. Janata, Federal CivilJury Trials Should Not be Abolished, 60 A.B.AJ. 934 (1974). But see
Landis,Jury Trials and the Delay of Justice, 56 A.B.A.J. 950 (1970). On recusal and disqualifi-
cation in general, see Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86
HARV. L. REv. 736 (1973).
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